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Notes
The Minnesota Supreme Court: 1980
This Note critically reviews a select group of decisions rendered by
the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1980. In one of thefirst decisions of its
kind in any jurisdiction, the court granted relief under the Human
Rights Act to a female who suffered sexual harassmentby her coworkers. In the area of corporatelaw, the court held that equitable estoppel
is a valid defense in an action under the Minnesota blue sky law for rescission of the sale of unregistered securities. In the area of criminal
procedure, the court also expanded the scope of a limited "stop and
frisk" weapons search to include the front seat of an automobile, approved the warrantlesssearchof a probationer'sapartmentby a probation officer when the officer has reliable information that the
probationeris using and selling drugs,and setforth criteriaon thefindings that trial courts must make in order to justify the revocation of
probation. In the area of evidence, the court followed the lead of a
number of otherjurisdictionsby holding that a person who had previously been hypnotized for purposes of memory refreshment could not
testify at a criminaltrial on the subject matter adduced at the hypnosis
interview. In another pairof cases, the court held that it is no longer
necessary to demonstrate intent to discriminatefor a taxpayer to recover for discriminatory tax assessment that the use of a special
method of assessment that results in substantialundervaluationof certain propertiesin relationto the plaintiffs property constitutes discrimination, and that the measure of relief in such a case should be a
reduction of the taxpayer's assessed value to the average percentage of
market value at which other propertyin the same class is assessed. Finally, in the area of torts, the court clarified the standardfor bystander
recovery, abrogated the remaining areas of parental immunity, and
held that common law malice is the appropriatestandardbothforfault
andfor punitive damages in a suit by an employee againsthis former
employer.
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I. CIVIL RIGHTS
A. SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY COWORKERS
Willie Ruth Hawkins, a black female, worked for the Continental Can Company between December 1974 and October
1975. During that time, her coworkers repeatedly made sexually derogatory remarks and sexual advances to her. One male
coworker frequently patted her on the posterior despite her objections. In March 1975, Hawkins complained to her supervisor
at the factory about this treatment, but refused to identify the
individuals responsible. No action was taken by Continental
and Hawkins continued working under these conditions without further complaint until October 13, 1975, when a coworker
approached her from behind and grabbed her between the legs.
Hawkins registered an immediate complaint with the plant
manager, but Continental took no action at that time. The
grabbing incident led to a series of near-violent confrontations
between Hawkins, her husband, and other workers. Fearing for
her safety, Hawkins refused to return to work and filed a
charge of sexual discrimination against Continental under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act.' After these events Continental
1. MIN. STAT. § 363.01-14 (1980). The Minnesota Human Rights Act provides in relevant part: "Except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair employment practice... (2) [f] or an employer, because
of race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex ... (c) to discriminate
against a person with respect to his hire, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment." MINN. STAT. § 363.03(1)
(1980).
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suspended two workers, launched an investigation, and
promulgated a company policy against sexual harassment. A
hearing examiner found that Continental had violated the law,
but the district court reversed. On appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed for Hawkins, holding that the prohibition against sex discrimination in the Minnesota Human Rights
Act includes sexual harassment of an employee by fellow employees when such harassment has a substantial impact on the
conditions of employment and the employer knew or should
have known of such conduct and failed to take timely and appropriate action. 2 ContinentalCan Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241
(Minn. 1980).
Sexual harassment cases raise two main legal issues: the
kind and degree of injury that the employee must suffer to
demonstrate sex discrimination and whether liability will be
imputed to the employer. Many Title VII3 sexual harassment
cases have involved a male supervisor who demanded sexual
favors from a female employee and then fired her when she refused. To prove sex discrimination in these situations, the employee must show that submission to the supervisor's sexual
advances was a condition of continued employment, 4 which
could be established only after the employee had rejected the
superior's advances and had been fired or denied a promotion. 5
Because only supervisory personnel can cause such actual eco2. The court found that Continental had committed two unfair, discriminatory employment practices. The first occurred in March, when the supervisor
was told of the harassment and the company failed to take any action. The second occurred on October 13, when the company failed to respond promptly after Hawkins complained of the grabbing incident. The court concluded that
Hawkins had been constructively discharged and reinstated a back pay award
set by the hearing examiner.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). The Civil Rights Act
rendered it an unlawful employment practice for nongovernmental employers
"to discriminate against any individual with respect to his . . . terms, condi"
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's... sex ....
See Ginsburg & Koreski, Sexual Advances by an Employee's Supervisor: A Sex
Discrimination Violation of Title VII?, 3 EMPLOYEE REL. UJ. 83 (1977); Siniscalco, Sexual Harassment and Employer Liability: The Flirtationthat Could
Cost a Fortune, 6 EMLOYEE REL. L.J. 277 (1980); Note, Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual Harassment, 64 MN. L. REv. 151, 153-67 (1979). For
the most comprehensive authority in this area, see C. MAcKNION, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
4. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 (3d
Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir.
1977).
5. The sexual advances by the supervisor are not in themselves regarded
as actionable. See, e.g., Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1390
(D. Colo. 1978) ("[T~ermination of plaintiff's employment when the advances
were rejected is what makes the conduct legally objectionable.").
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nomic loss, this injury standard has not protected the employee
6
from harassment by other employees.
An alternative standard is supported by commentators, 7 a
body of cases involving racial harassment, 8 and, most recently,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission interim
guidelines on sexual harassment under Title VII.9 Under this
standard, the employee need only demonstrate that the sexually harassing conduct affected the conditions of employment
by creating a hostile work environment. This standard can be
applied to cases of harassment by co-employees as well as by
supervisors and does not require that the employee be terminated from employment to recover. Courts, however, have
been reluctant to adopt this approach because of the difficulty
of proving such a vague concept as "working atmosphere."' 0
As to the second issue, the imputation of liability to the
employer, the courts have adopted a variety of approaches. A
few of the oldest cases indicated that the employer would not
be liable for sexual harassment of employees by supervisors
unless such activity reflected a policy of the employer." The
6. Another option available to the employee is to bring suit in tort against
the offending superior or coemployee. The possible causes of action include assault, battery, intentional infliction of mental distress, and tortious interference
with a contractual relationship. The principal problem with this approach is
that courts are generally loathe to extend respondeat superior to hold the employer liable for the intentional torts of a supervisor. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983, 995, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring). See generally Note, Sexual Harassmentin the Workplace: A Practitioner'sGuide to Tort
Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L REv. 879 (1980); Note, supra note 3, at 167-76.
7. E.g., Note, Sexual Harassmentand Title VII: Foundationfor the Elimination of Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 McH. L. REv.
1007, 1035 (1978).
8. In these cases the plaintiff alleged racial harassment in the workplace
in violation of Title VII. See, e.g., DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 800 (1st
Cir. 1980) (black employee subjected to threatening notes and "silent treatment" from coworkers); Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568
F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (occasional ethnic slurs by supervisor); E.E.O.C. v.
Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 384-85 (D. Minn. 1980)
(black employee subjected to vicious and frequent instances of racial harassment by coworkers).
9. In April, 1980, the E.E.O.C. promulgated guidelines for sexual harassment cases brought under Title VII. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980).
10. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55, 74
(E.D. Pa. 1977) ("Such a nebulous concept-that of atmosphere-is not susceptible to any accepted methods of proof in a court of law."). For a decision rendered after Continental Can that has adopted the "working conditions"
approach to sexual harassment cases, see Bundy v. Jackson, No. 79-1693 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 12, 1981).
11. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz.
1975). Cf. Ludington v. Sambo's Restaurant, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480, 483 (E.D.
Wis. 1979) (individual acts of sexual harassment by supervisors not actionable
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majority position, however, is less stringent. Under this standard, the employer is liable for discriminatory sexual harassment of which it had actual or constructive notice and failed to
take appropriate measures. 12 Two recent cases go even further,
dictating that an employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment perpetrated by supervisors or agents, regardless of the
extent of the employer's knowledge.' 3 The new E.E.O.C. guidelines adopt a similar position, automatically rendering the employer vicariously liable for the conduct of agents and
supervisors, and holding the employer liable for the conduct of
other employees to the extent that the employer is found to
have had actual or constructive knowledge of the conduct and
failed to act.14
In Continental Can, the Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished the Title VII sexual harassment cases 5 involving retaliation by a supervisor and instead relied on the more closely
analagous cases involving racial harassment of a minority employee by other employees.' 6 The court also referred to the
E.E.O.C. interim guidelines, which characterize "[u]nwelcome
sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature" as sexual harassment
when "such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating
7
an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment."'
The court noted that at some point sexual harassment such as
the kind suffered by Hawkins becomes sufficiently pervasive
and objectionable as to create a working environment different
for women than it is for men. When the conduct "impact[s] on
the conditions of employment," there is discrimination on the
basis of sex.18 The court concluded that the verbal and physiunless actively or tacitly sanctioned by the employer or unless such acts constitute an official policy of the employer). The Come decision is criticized in
Comment, Employment Discrimination-SexualHarassmentand Title VII, 51
N.Y.U.L. REv. 148 (1976).
12. See, e.g., cases cited in note 4 supra.
13. See Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979); Barnes
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
14. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980).
15. It is well established that the court may look to principles established
in Title VII actions when deciding a case under the Minnesota Human Rights
Act. See Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn. 1978).
16. See note 8 supra.
17. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980).
18. Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d at 248. The court intimated
that this new focus on working conditions was not very different from the traditional cases dealing with sexual favors demanded as a condition of continued
employment. In effect, where sexual harassment is regularly part of the job ex-
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cal abuse Hawkins suffered amounted to sexual discrimination.
The employer would be liable for such discrimination, the court
continued, when it had actual or constructive knowledge of the
conduct and failed to take prompt and appropriate action.19
The employer would be deemed to have constructive
knowledge when a supervisor or a manager became aware of
the conditions. 20 When the employer has knowledge of harassment, but the identity of the harassers is unknown, the employer should issue a policy statement opposing sexual
harassment. 2 1 When the identity of the offenders is known, the
company should investigate immediately and warn the individuals against recurrences, or, in the extreme cases, suspend
them. 22 It is clear from the court's opinion that prompt effort
must be made to prevent further instances of harassment. 23
The court noted that Continental's response to the harassment
of Hawkins would have been adequate if the company had ac24
ted more rapidly.
As a case of first impression under the Minnesota Human
Rights Act and one of the first decisions in any jurisdiction allowing recovery against an employer for harassment committed
by other employees, 25 the ContinentalCan decision represents
a major development both in Minnesota law and in the law of
sex discrimination. It affirms the right of employees to relief
from psychologically harmful sexual harassment. It also provides that the employee need no longer wait to be fired before
taking legal action. Although some employers will find the burden that the court has placed upon them objectionable, the burden is not an onerous one. The actual or constructive notice
standard has already proven itself fair and workable, 26 and the
requirement that the employer take appropriate action is flexperience, then continued employment is contingent on enduring that harassment. See id.
19. Id. at 249.
20. See id. at 246, 250. Although the court specifically avoided the issue of
employer liability for harassing conduct perpetrated by a supervisor, id. at 249
n.5, the standard of constructive notice to the employer when a supervisor has
knowledge would seem to point to automatic vicarious liability of the employer
when the supervisor is the harasser. This result would be consistent with the
new E.E.O.C. guidelines. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
21. See 297 N.W.2d at 250.
22. Id.

23. Id.
24.
25.
volving
26.

Id. at 250-51.
Cf. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335, 340 (D.N.J. 1979) (inharassment and other forms of sex discrimination).
See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49

(3d Cir. 1977).
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ible, taking into consideration such factors as the resources
available to the firm to undertake immediate investigations of
alleged harassment. Moreover, the court specifically rejected
as overly severe the proposal that an employer has a duty to
maintain a working environment free from sexual harassment;
the employer only has a duty to act when it knows or should

know of harassment. 27 The major problem created by the
court's holding is that of defining when the environment of a
workplace has become so adversely affected by sexal harassment as to create a cause of action for discrimination.
Presented in Continental Can with a case involving physical as
well as verbal harassment, the Minnesota Supreme Court provided little guidance for trial courts on where to draw the line
28
in more difficult cases.
II. CORPORATIONS
A.

EQUTrABLE ESTOPPEL AS A DEFENSE TO RECISSION OF
STOCK SALE

Panuska and Howard were the sole shareholders in a corporation that owned and operated a restaurant. In 1969, Howard agreed to sell his interest and Panuska made arrangements
for thirteen other investors to purchase Howard's shares. The
investors, some of whom were regular patrons of the restaurant, were not fraudulently induced to purchase the shares. After purchasing the stock, some of the investors participated
extensively in the management of the business.' The business
continued for about three years before failing. The investors
brought two separate actions against Panuska to rescind the
27. Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d at 249.
28. The court noted that instances of alleged discrimination would have to
be judged on a case-by-case basis. Id. Future courts may find it useful to refer
to the body of case law on racial harassment, in which an "excessive and opprobrious" standard has been invoked in several cases. See, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas
City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977); Rogers v.
E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). Some
cases also specify that the conduct be "a concerted pattern of harassment" and
not merely isolated, casual instances of verbal insults. See E.E.O.C. v. Murphy
Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 385 (D. Minn. 1980); Fekete v. United
States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177, 1186 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
1. Logan, for example, became a director and first vice president of the
corporation. He was involved in the day-to-day control of the kitchen operations, -and for a time was authorized to write checks on the corporation's behalf
and assist in making personnel decisions. Logan v. Panuska, 293 N.W.2d 359,
361 (Minn. 1980). But see id. at 365 (J. Scott, dissenting) (investors' input to
management merely advisory and undertaken out of a desire to safeguard their
investments).
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original sale of stock and recover the purchase price on
grounds that the shares had not been registered under the
state blue sky laws.2 Defendant Panuska invoked the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel, 3 claiming that plaintiffs' participation in the management of the business estopped them
from rescinding the sale. The defense was allowed in one action and disallowed in the other.4 On appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court consolidated the actions, holding that estoppel
is a valid defense in an action for rescission under the Minnesota blue sky laws and may be invoked by the seller when the
purchaser was not fraudulently induced to invest and the purchaser actively participated in the management and control of
the corporation during the course of the investment. Logan v.
Panuska, 293 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. 1980).
The remedy of rescission in the context of blue sky laws
serves a dual function. It compensates the injured purchaser of
securities, and, by depriving the seller of any wrongful gain, it
compels sellers to comply with the law by registering the securities to be offered with the state.5 The first function is essentially equitable; the second is penal. The inherent tension
between these two aspects of blue sky rescission has been re2. 1955 MINN. LAWS ch. 19, § 2 provided: "No securities except those exempt under section 80.05 and those sold in sales exempt under section 80.06,
shall be offered for sale or sold within the state unless such securities have
been registered pursuant to sections 80.08 or 80.09. . . ." This act was repealed
in 1973. 1973 MINN. LAws ch. 941, § 1. The current law is substantially the same
as to the registration requirement, providing: "It is unlawful for any person to
offer or sell any security in this state unless (a) it is registered under sections
80A.01 to 80A.31 or (b) the security or transaction is exempted under section
80A.15." MINN. STAT. § 80A.08 (1980). The Logan case was tried and reviewed
on appeal under the older statute, which provided for civil liability of the seller
who violated any of the various registration requirements. The current version
is found at MINN.STAT. § 80A.23 (1980).
The academic literature on blue sky laws is substantial. See, e.g., L. Loss &
E. CowETr, BLUE SKY LAw (1958); Perlman, A CriticalAnalysis of the Registration Provisions of the Minnesota SecuritiesAct, 56 MINN. L. REv. 523 (1972).
3. From the facts appearing in the opinion, the defense appeared closer to
one of ratification than estoppel. Equitable estoppel typically requires detrimental reliance by the party asserting the defense. Ratification, however, is
merely confirmation implied through conduct, and does not require that the
other party be prejudiced. See 3 J. POMEROY, EQurry JURISPRUDENCE §§ 805, 916

(5th ed. 1941).
4. See Logan v. Panuska, 293 N.W.2d at 362.
5. There are two purposes behind the registration requirement: to insure
that information regarding the company and its securities is available for the
potential investor to inspect, and to give the state administrator an opportunity
to inspect the offering in order to determine the degree of risk involved. The
utility of the second purpose has been questioned, and there has been considerable sentiment for curbing or discarding this type of regulation. See, e.g., J.
MoFsKY,BLUE SKY RESTmCTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 15-17 (1971).
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solved differently in various jurisdictions. Courts in the major6
ity of states still emphasize the penal or deterrent function,
construing their blue sky laws to preclude a seller from using
the equitable defenses of estoppel and ratification. In a substantial minority of states,7 however, courts consider the equities at stake and occasionally allow such defenses. These
courts take into account such factors as the absence of fraudulent inducement, 8 the purchaser's participation in the management of the firm,9 the acceptance of dividends and other
benefits,' 0 any undue delay in bringing suit,." and the extent of
the purchaser's knowledge of the illegality of the transaction
2
and of investments in general.1
The Minnesota blue sky statute does not specify whether
the defense of estoppel should be allowed in a purchaser's action for rescission.13 In previous cases, courts have recognized
App. 3d 514, 525, 314 N.E.2d 549, 557
6. See, e.g., Gowdy v. Richter, 20 Ill.
(1974); Covert v. Cross, 331 S.W.2d 576, 585 (Mo. 1960). See also United Bank &
Trust Co. v. Joyner, 40 Ariz. 229, 11 P.2d 829 (1932); Regan v. Albin, 219 Cal. 357,
26 P.2d 475 (1933); Kneeland v. Emerton, 280 Mass. 371, 183 N.E. 155 (1932). See
generally Note, Denying Purchasersthe Assertion of Illegality under Blue Sky
Laws, 42 VA. L, REV. 205 (1956).
7. See, e.g., Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 788, 552
S.W.2d 4, 14 (1977) (defenses of laches and estoppel allowed in absence of allegation of fraud); Popper v. Havana Publications, Inc., 122 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (estoppel is permissible where sale is voidable); Goldblum
v. Boyd, 341 So. 2d 436, 447-43 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (plaintiff estopped by actively
participating in management); Tucker v. McDells, Inc., 50 Tenn. App. 62, 71, 359
S.W.2d 597, 600 (1962) (investor taking active part in management estopped
from rescinding); Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d 662, 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)
(purchaser found in pari delicto knowing that stock was not registered at time
of purchase).
8. E.g., Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 778, 552 S.W.2d
4, 14 (1977).
9. E.g., Tucker v. McDells, Inc., 50 Tenn. App. 62, 71, 359 S.W.2d 597, 600
(1962). Cf. Loewenstein v. Midwestern Investment Co., 181 Neb. 547, 553-54, 149
N.W.2d 512, 516 (1967) (no estoppel when plaintiff was subsequently elected to
the issuing corporation's board of directors and attended two meetings, but did
not participate in management).
10. E.g., Tawney v. Blankenship, 150 Kan. 41, 46, 90 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1939).
11. E.g., id.
12. E.g., Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d 662, 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
13. The old statute provided virtually no guidance to courts presiding over
civil actions. See 1941 MINN. LAws ch. 547, § 18. The new statute is more explicit in some respects, but does not deal with the problem of ratification and
estoppel. It does, however, specify that suits must be brought "in equity," possibly implying an acknowledgment of the traditional equitable defenses. MMNn.
STAT. § 80A.23(1) (1980). On the other hand, another clause prohibits the express waiver of any provision of the state blue sky laws by the purchaser.
MINN. STAT. § 80A.23(10) (1980). This clause could be interpreted as excluding
implied waiver, or ratification, as well. See generally L. Loss & E. CoWETT,
supra note 2, at 174-75. Finally, Mi-N. STAT. § 80A.23(9) (1980), which codifies in
part the defense of in pari delicto, might be interpreted as intended to negate
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only the defenses of the statute of limitations14 and in pari
delicto in applying Minnesota law.15 Reasoning that sales of
securities in violation of blue sky requirements are "void"
rather than "voidable,"1 6 courts have concluded that the defense of ratification is not available.17
In Logan, the Minnesota Supreme Court began by rejecting the characterization of the sale as either void or voidable.18 It noted that there was no indication of legislative intent
to make all sales contrary to the statute void,' 9 and that on
prior occasions the court had simply overlooked the voidness
problem when equity so .demanded.2o The court went on to approve the defense of equitable estoppel for two reasons. First,
the court argued that it would be inequitable to allow the plaintiffs to place the entire loss upon the defendant when both
were actively involved in operating the business and the plaintiffs had not been induced to buy into the corporation.2 1 Second, the court characterized the plaintiffs' suits as attempts to
use the blue sky law to correct their own errors of business
judgment.22 The court considered such managerial business errors too remote from the major purpose of the law, which is to
any other defenses. The legislative history of the 1973 act, however, is devoid of
any consideration of the ratification or estoppel defenses. See Journal of the
House, 514, 2012, 2040, 2451, 2595 (1973); Journal of the Senate, 354, 410, 451, 1240,
1621, 2014, 2881, 2854, 3740 (1973).
14. See City of New York, Inc. v. Stern, 110 F.2d 601, 603 (8th Cir. 1940) (applying Minnesota law), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 666 (1941).
15. See McCauley v. Michael, 256 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Minn. 1977). The court
extended this defense beyond its usual bounds to include instances in which
the purchaser was merely aware of the illegality of the transaction. The court
was careful to note, however, that this was a suit brought by the purchaser to
specifically enforce the contract of sale, not to rescind it. In Webster v. U.SJ.
Realty Co., 170 Minn. 360, 361, 212 N.W. 806, 807 (1927), the court held that a purchaser was not in pari delicto with the seller by the mere fact of having
purchased unregistered securities.
16. See Stern v. National City Co., 25 F. Supp. 948, 957 (D. Minn. 1938) (applying Minnesota law); Drees v. Minnesota Petroleum Co., 189 Minn. 608, 610,
250 N.W. 563, 565 (1933), Vercellini v. U.S.I. Realty Co., 158 Mimi. 72, 72, 196 N.W.
672, 672 (1924).
17. Voidable contracts may be ratified, whereas void ones may not. 1A A.
CORBN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 227, 228 (1962).
18. Logan v. Panuska, 293 N.W.2d at 363.
19. Id.
20. In Matin v. Olson, 181 Minn. 327, 328, 232 N.W. 523, 523 (1930), and
Parker v. Merritt, 164 Minn. 305, 306, 204 N.W. 941, 942 (1925), the court construed the sale as "voidable" in order to estop the purchaser from denying ownership of the stock as against an innocent third party creditor. This is a classic
illustration of estoppel, since there was detrimental reliance by the third party.
See note 3 supra.
21. Logan v. Panuska, 293 N.W.2d at 364.
22. Id. at 363.
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protect investors from injury incurred through the sale of un23
registered securities.
The court proceeded wisely in discarding the void-voidable
dichotomy as a basis for decision. This approach is riddled
with exceptions and is no longer followed in most jurisdictions.24 Given language that limits its holding to cases not involving fraudulent inducement, 2 5 a reasonable balance is struck
between equity and deterrence. The only major drawback is
that this new rule may be more difficult to administer than a
simple bar to the defense. For example, the court's implied distinction between investment activity and business activity 26
may prove troublesome in deciding when to allow the defense,
especially in a case where the investors participate in managing the firm in a minimal way only to safeguard their investments. Maintaining the distinction is important, however, to
ensure that blue sky protection does not exceed its intended
boundaries.
I.
A.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

LIMITED WEAPONS SEARCH

Four St. Paul, Minnesota police officers were observing a
suspected after-hours liquor establishment. One of the officers
noticed a car parked in an adjacent lot that was similar to the
vehicle described in a notice posted at police headquarters.
The notice stated that the driver of the car, Earl Gilchrist, was
suspected of involvement in a homicide in Nebraska and was
probably armed. The notice also included a picture of Gilchrist,
but did not state whether warrants had been issued for his arrest.' In addition to the information provided by the notice, the
officers knew of an incident at an after-hours establishment the
year before in which Gilchrist allegedly shot a gun at another
person. When the officers approached the vehicle one of them
recognized Gilchrist sitting in the front seat; Gilchrist was
asked to get out of the car and to produce identification. Although the exact order of the subsequent events is not clear,
23. Justice Scott entered a forceful dissent, arguing that the majority's approach was inconsistent with the express terms of the statute and would tend
to undermine the statute's deterrent effect. Id. at 364 (Scott, J., dissenting).
24. See L. Loss & E. CowErr, supra note 2, at 131.
25. Logan v. Panuska, 293 N.W.2d at 363.
26. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
1. No copy of the notice could be found for production at trial. State v.
Gilchrist, 299 N.W.2d 913, 914 (Minn. 1980).
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one of the officers patted down Gilchrist while two others
searched the car for weapons. The officers found a cut soda
straw of the type used to ingest cocaine in Gilchrist's pocket
and a gun under the front seat. After finding the gun the officers arrested Gilchrist and took him to the police station
where he was searched and an envelope filled with cocaine was
found in his pocket. Although Gilchrist challenged the admission of the straw, the gun, and the cocaine, the trial court convicted him of possession of a pistol without a permit and
possession of cocaine. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the police properly subjected the defendant to a
forcible stop and limited weapons search and that the area beneath the front seat of the defendant's automobile was within
the proper scope of the limited weapons search. State v. Gilchrist, 299 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. 1980).
The United States Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio,2
that a police officer who has reason to believe that he or she is
dealing with an armed and dangerous person may conduct a
"carefully limited search" of the person's outer clothing for
weapons that may be used to attack the officer, even if the officer does not have probable cause for an arrest.3 Because such
a search is reasonable under the fourth amendment,4 any
weapons seized in the course of the search may be introduced
into evidence.5 The primary rationale for allowing the search is
the officer's self-protection.6 Although the Supreme Court has
not determined whether the permissible scope of a Terry
search includes the interior of a suspect's car if the suspect is
in the vehicle when stopped, several United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals have held that in conducting an otherwise
proper stop and frisk, the police may search a person's automobile.7 These courts state that such searches are justified to protect the officers, reasoning that the suspect may have a weapon
concealed in the vehicle as well as on his or her person.8 The
Fifth Circuit has suggested, however, that once a person has
2. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3. Id. at 30. See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968).
4. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 25, 27.
5. Id. at 31.
6. See id. at 30.
7. United States v. Wilkerson, 598 F.2d 621, 624-25 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United
States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980
(1979); United States v. Green, 465 F.2d 620, 624-25 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also
United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
931 (1974) (dictum).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 598 F.2d 621, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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left the vehicle, he or she no longer has access to any weapon
that might be concealed there, and thus a weapon hidden in the
9
car does not present a danger to the investigating officer.
Moreover, as the Massachusetts Supreme Court has observed,
the suspect "could hardly be viewed as a potential assailant after he had returned to his vehicle and knew that he had not
been detained by the police."o In Minnesota, the extension of
the scope of a Terry search to the interior of a suspect's car had
never been addressed prior to Gilchrist."
In concluding that the area underneath the front seat of
Gilchrist's automobile was within the scope of a limited weapons search, the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that a
weapon concealed in the car would continue to pose a danger
to police even after the suspect's release. As the court observed, Gilchrist might have reentered his car, "pull[ed] out a
gun, and start[ed] shooting."12 Because Gilchrist was known to
carry firearms and had a reputation for violence, the officers
were justified in searching his car for readily accessible weapons. 13 Nevertheless, the court recognized that the car search
was a "close case" under Terry and expressly limited the Gilchrist holding to the "special situation" in which the suspect's
past record justifies the officer's reasonable belief that the suspect may be armed.14
Justice Wahl, in a dissent joined by Justice Rogosheske,
took exception to the court's conclusion that the scope of a
5
Terry frisk included the interior of defendant's car.1 Justice
Wahl emphasized that under Terry, "a frisk is constitutionally
limited to a pat-down search of the outer clothing of the suspect to discover weapons which might be used to assault the officer."16 Moreover, Justice Wahl noted, that the "general nonhostile atmosphere" of the encounter between Gilchrist and
the police indicated that "the search was not reasonably justi9. See Government of Canal Zone v. Bender, 573 F.2d 1329, 1332 (5th Cir.
1978).
10. Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 409, 318 N.E.2d 895, 900 (1974).
11. The Minnesota Supreme Court has previously dealt with other aspects
of a search under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See, e.g., State v. Bitterman,
304 Minn. 481, 484-85, 232 N.W.2d 91, 93-94 (1975); State v. O'Neill, 299 Minn. 60,
65-70, 216 N.W.2d 822, 826-29 (1974) (dictum); State v. Gannaway, 291 Minn. 391,
392-93, 191 N.W.2d 555, 556-57 (1971).
12. State v. Gilchrist, 299 N.W. 2d at 917.
13. See id. at 918.
14. Id. at 917-18.
15. Id. at 918 (Wahl, J., dissenting).
16. Id. (Wahl, J., dissenting).
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fled by a concern for the officers' immediate safety."17
On balance, the concerns raised by the dissent are valid. It
seems unlikely that a suspect, in the normal course of events,
would attack police officers after he or she had been stopped,
questioned, and released. If police officers feared that this
might occur, they could place the suspect in the back of their
squad car during questioning. The suspect would then have to
walk back to his or her vehicle after questioning, thus affording
the suspect little opportunity to retrieve a weapon and harm
the officers. As the Terry court observed, a search and seizure
is not justified unless "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,"'18
and under Terry the primary justification for the search is protection of the officer. Moreover, the "special situation" test announced in Gilchrist is potentially subject to abuse, and may in
fact encourage otherwise prohibited searches on the pretext
that the officers had unsubstantiated, private information that
the suspect had a reputation for armed violence. Thus, the
court erred in expanding the Supreme Court's limited exception to the probable cause requirement in Terry-unfortunately, such an expansion may well be exploited as a means to
erode fourth amendment rights.19
B.

WARRATLESS

SEARCH BY PROBATION OFFICER

Glenn Arnold Earnest's probation officer received reliable
information that Earnest was using and selling drugs, and
searched Earnest's apartment. Although the probation officer
had probable cause for the search,' he did not obtain a warrant.
The officer discovered and seized amphetamine capsules,
which were later admitted into evidence during Earnest's probation revocation hearing. The trial court revoked probation on
grounds that Earnest violated the terms of his probation by illegally possessing controlled substances. 2 The Minnesota
17. Id. (Wahl, J., dissenting).
18. 392 U.S. at 20. See also Comment, 13 SuFFOLu U.L. REV. 1101, 1117
(1979).
19. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 153 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissent-

ing).
1. State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365, 367 n.1 (Minn. 1980).
2. Id. at 368. The trial court also found that Earnest violated the terms of
his probation by terminating his employment without permission and by assaulting his parents. These violations were insufficient to require revocation,
however, absent the finding that Earnest illegally possessed a controlled substance. Id.
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Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a warrantless probable
cause search of a probationer's residence by a probation officer
is reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment when the
search is based on reliable information that the probationer is
using and selling drugs. State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365 (Minn.
1980).
The fourth amendment secures "[t]he right of the people
...
against unreasonable searches and seizures" by requiring
investigating officers to obtain a warrant, predicated on a showing of probable cause, before conducting a search.3 Although it
4
has recognized certain exceptions to the warrant requirement,
the United States Supreme Court has expressed a "strong preference" for searches and seizures conducted pursuant to a
search warrant.5
The Court has not indicated whether searches by probation
officers are governed by the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, but several other courts have held that a probation
or parole officer may conduct a reasonable search of a probationer or parolee 6 without obtaining a warrant. 7 Arguing that a
parolee has a lesser expectation of privacy than an ordinary citizen,8 and that the state has a special interest in supervising a
parolee, 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Latta v. Fitzharris'0 concluded that a warrantless search
by a parole officer is reasonable and does not violate the fourth
amendment when the parole officer "reasonably believes that
[a] search is necessary."" In order to buttress this conclusion,
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.1(a), at 3-5 (1978). Among
the exceptions to the warrant requirement noted by Professor LaFave are
searches incident to a lawful arrest, searches under exigent circumstances, and
searches conducted pursuant to the suspect's consent. Id.
5. Id. at 3.
6. The fourth amendment rights of probationers and parolees are generally viewed as equivalent. See 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 4,§ 10.10, at 422.
7. See, e.g., Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); United States ex re. Radazzo v. Follette,
282 F. Supp. 10, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aDfd, 418 F.2d 1319, 1322 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971); People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 150-51, 40
Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965); People v. Santos, 31
A.D.2d 508, 509, 298 N.Y.S.2d 526, 528, afd, 25 N.Y.2d 976, 252 N.E.2d 861, 305
N.Y.S.2d 365 (1969).
8. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.) (plurality opinion), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
9. Id. at 249.
10. 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897

(1975).
11. Id. at 250. The court stated that the officer's decision "may be based
upon specific facts, though they be less than sufficient to sustain a finding of
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the court compared warrantless searches by parole officers to
warrantless administrative searches,12 which are allowed ifthe
warrant requirement would frustrate the purposes of the
search.' 3 Applying this reasoning to the parole context, the
Latta court argued that a warrant requirement would impair
the ability of parole officers to supervise parolees.14
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that parole officers may conduct warrantless searches of parolees has been criticized by
some courts' 5 and commentators.16 In a recent pair of decisions, the Fourth Circuit held that, absent exigent circumstances, parole and probation officers cannot conduct
warrantless searches of parolees and probationers, 17 and that
evidence seized in such searches should be excluded from
criminal proceedings, parole hearings, and probation revocation
hearings.18 The Fourth Circuit reasoned in United States v.
Workman,' 9 that a probation revocation hearing is adjudicative
and may result in the probationer's loss of liberty. Because a
probation revocation hearing is equivalent to a criminal prosecution in these respects, the court concluded that a probationer
is entitled to invoke the same exclusionary rule that is avail20
able to criminal defendants.
In holding that a probation officer's warrantless probable
cause search of a probationer was reasonable for purposes of
the fourth amendment, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied
without reservation on the Latta decision. In reaching the conclusion that the special demands of the probation relationship 2'
probable cause." Id. Although the court's opinion stated that a parole officer's
"hunch" was sufficient grounds to conduct a warrantless search, two concurring
judges did not accept the sufficiency of a hunch. See id. at 253-54 (Choy and
Merrill, J.J., concurring).
12. Id. at 251.
13. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
14. The Latta court cited United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (warrantless search under Gun Control Act held valid), and Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (warrantless search under liquor licensee statute), as authority for the extension of the administrative search exception to parole officers. See 521 F.2d at 251.
15. See United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789 (4th Cir. 1978). See also Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d at 254-59 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
16. See, e.g., Recent Decisions, 47 GEO. WASH. L REv. 863 (1979).
17. United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789 (4th Cir. 1978). The Bradley
court relied on Judge Hufstedler's dissent in Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d at 25459 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 571 F.2d at 789.
18. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1978).
19. 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978).
20. Id. at 1209-10.
21. These special demands include "the pervasiveness of the regulation to
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justify warrantless searches, the court endorsed Latta's analogy to administrative searches. 22 Although acknowledging that
Workman provided authority for a contrary result, the court
stated, without elaboration, that "under the facts and circum23
Fistances of this case, Latta ... is ... more persuasive."
nally, because it concluded that the search did not violate the
fourth amendment, the court declined to rule on the applicability of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceed24
ings.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's reliance on Latta is misplaced. First, the Ninth Circuit's assertion that the fourth
amendment requires only that a search be reasonable is incorrect. Rather, the fourth amendment has consistently been construed to require a warrant, unless a warrant requirement
would be unreasonable. 25 Second, the Latta court inaccurately
asserted that a warrantless search by a parole officer is analogous to a warrantless administrative search. In fact, the two
situations are readily distinguishable. Cases upholding warrantless administrative searches involve statutes that expressly
waive the warrant requirement and set forth detailed regulations governing the scope of the search.2 6 In the probation context there is no statutory waiver and there are no regulations
which the probationer is subject, [and] the lowered expectation of privacy of
the probationer." 293 N.W.2d at 369. The court also argued that unless probation officers are granted the means to effectively supervise probationers, courts
will be reluctant to grant probation, thus undermining the viability of the probation system as an alternative to incarceration. Id.
22. Id. at 368 & n.3.
23. Id. at 369 n.4. Although the Earnest court implied that the case at bar
was distinguished from Workman, upon analysis Latta, Workman, and Earnest
are similar in all material respects. All three involved warrantless searches by
corrections officers under circumstances in which the officer could have obtained a warrant prior to the search. The probation officers in both Workman
and Earnest had received information that their probationers were dealing in
illegal liquor and drugs, respectively. It is likely that a warrant to search for
the contraband would issue under these circumstances. In Latta, the defendant was already in custody when his parole officer conducted the search. Having discovered Latta smoking marijuana, the parole officer could reasonably
expect to obtain a warrant to search for more marijuana at the defendant's
home. Finally, because Latta was in custody, and Earnest and Workman were
presumably unaware of their probation officers' suspicions, it is unlikely that
important evidence would have been lost in any of the three cases during the
few hours delay necessary to procure the warrant.
24. 293 N.W.2d at 369.
25. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d at 254-55 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (citing,
e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972)).
26. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 311-12 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 73-74 (1970).
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governing warrantless searches by probation officers. 27 Under
the United States Supreme Court's balancing test for warrantless administrative searches, the state must show that the
"burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search." 28 A warrant requirement,
however, would not impair the ability of a probation officer to
supervise a probationer.29 Furthermore, the consequence of
following Latta and finding the, search in Earnest reasonable
under the fourth amendment is that the evidence seized by the
probation officer would often be admissible in a criminal prosecution. 30 Probation officers are thus allowed to gather evidence
for purposes of criminal prosecution in a manner that the police themselves could not pursue, and there is the possibility
that police will enlist probation officers to conduct warrantless
searches.
Concerned about the use of evidence seized by probation
officers in criminal prosecutions, Justice Rogosheske stated in a
special concurrence to Earnest that probation officers' warrantless searches should be held in violation of the fourth amendment, but argued against the extension of the exclusionary rule
to probation revocation hearings. 3 1 The effect of Justice
Rogosheske's approach would be to preclude the use of evidence in criminal prosecutions where the exclusionary rule is
well established,32 but to allow such evidence in probation revocation hearings. It seems odd, however, to instruct probation
officers that they may violate a probationer's fourth amendment rights with impunity,3 3 so long as the fruits of the search
27. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d at 255-56 (Hufstedier, J., dissenting).
28. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
29. Probation officers could make home visits without a warrant; on the basis of observations made in the course of a visit, a probation officer could obtain
a warrant, or, under exigent circumstances, could immediately conduct a warrantless search and seizure. See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d at 258 (Hufstedier,
J., dissenting).
30. The majority reserved this issue for determination at a later time, but
suggested that there would be circumstances under which such evidence could
be admitted into a criminal prosecution. See 293 N.W.2d at 369 n.6. In his concurrence, Justice Rogosheske indicated that so long as the majority found the
search reasonable, there would be "no legal basis" for excluding the evidence
from a criminal prosecution. Id. at 370 (Rogosheske, J., concurring). In Latta v.
Fitzharris,the evidence seized by Latta's parole officer was held to have been
properly admitted in his criminal trial for possession of marijuana. 521 F.2d at
252-53.
31. 293 N.W.2d at 370-71 (Rogosheske, J., concurring). Justices Otis, Yetka,
and Wahl joined in Justice Rogosheske's concurrence. Id.
32. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
33. A probationer or parolee who has been the victim of a warrantless
search may, of course, bring a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) for violation of
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are confined to the probation revocation proceeding. A better
approach would be to require probation officers to obtain
search warrants3 4 and to exclude evidence illegally obtained by
probation officers from both probation revocation proceedings
and criminal proceedings. The warrant requirement would not
be so onerous as to impair the effective functioning of the probation system,3 5 and the exclusion of illegally obtained evi36
dence would deter abuses by probation officers and police.

C. REVOCATION OF PROBATION
Jerry Dean Austin received a suspended sentence and was
placed on probation for six years after pleading guilty to aggravated assault and burglary.' Probation was revoked during the
first year because Austin left the drug rehabilitation program to
which he had been admitted, but the trial court declined to execute the original sentence and instead ordered that Austin
spend ninety days in the St. Louis County Jail, to be followed
by another six years of probation. Upon his release from the
county jail, Austin's probation officer arranged for him to enroll
in a drug rehabilitation program at Eden House in Minneapolis.
Austin was told by the probation officer that "'if for any reason
he did not enter the program, he should return to the St. Louis
County Jail.' "2 Austin reported to Eden House as ordered on
Friday, August 11, 1978, but during his initial interview indicated that "he was scared and wanted the weekend to think
about his decision to enter the program."3 Austin was denied
admission to the program when he returned after the weekend
because the director mistakenly believed that he had failed to
report on the previous Friday. Austin voluntarily returned to
his or her civil rights. As Judge Hufstedier observed, however, such a suit
would be "very brave or very foolhardy," because of the possibility of retribution. 521 F.2d at 258.
34. The issuance of the search warrant might be premised on a lesser
showing of probable cause than is applied for other kinds of searches. See
United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 790 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-38 (1967)); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d at 257
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting); Recent Decisions, supra note 16, at 880.
35. See note 29 supra.
36. Under United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-51 (1974), the application of the exclusionary rule is conditioned on a showing that the deterrent effect of exclusion outweighs the impediments to the proceeding caused by
exclusion.
1.
Austin,
2.
3.

The guilty plea was entered pursuant to a plea agreement. State v.
295 N.W.2d 246, 248 (Minn. 1980).
Id. at 249.
Id.
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the St. Louis County Jail on Thursday, August 17, 1978. The
trial court revoked probation and reinstated Austin's sentence
on grounds that Austin violated the terms of his probation. On
appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in
the future a trial court should revoke probation only if it finds
that in light of the probationer's intentional or inexcusable violations of specified probation conditions, the balance of the
competing policies underlying the decision to continue proba4
tion or reinstate the prison sentence favors incarceration.
State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. 1980).
Appellate courts generally defer to the discretion of the
trial court in probation revocation proceedings 5 because the
trial judge is best able to evaluate the weight of the evidence
and the probationer's prospects for rehabilitation. 6 Recently,
however, some appellate courts have reversed lower court revocation decisions, reasoning that "It]he decision to revoke probation should not merely be a reflexive reaction to an
accumulation of technical violations ....
Rather, probation
should be revoked only in those instances in which the offender's behavior demonstrates that he or she 'cannot be
counted on to avoid antisocial activity.'"7 Other appellate
courts have reversed trial court revocations because the probationer's failure to comply with the terms of probation was ex4. The court held that although the trial court did not specify the condition of probation that Austin violated, there was sufficient evidence on the record to find that Austin intentionally disobeyed his probation officer. Id. at 250.
In addition, the court held that even though it is preferable that a probationer
receive a written copy of the terms of probation, the oral instructions Austin
received were sufficient under the facts of this case, id. at 251, and that Austin
waived the issue of whether he was given sufficient notice of the grounds for
revocation by failing to raise this matter at the revocation hearing. Id. at 252.
5. See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 221 (1932); United States
v. Burkhalter, 588 F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir. 1978); Pearson v. State, 308 Minn. 287,
293, 241 N.W.2d 490, 494 (1976); State ex rel. Halverson v. Young, 278 Minn. 381,
387, 154 N.W.2d 699, 703 (1967); State ex rel. Newman v. Wall, 189 Minn. 265, 267,
249 N.W. 37, 38 (1933). See also MNN. STAT. § 609.14 (1980).
6. See Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 366-67, 38 S.E.2d 479, 484
(1946).
7. United States v. Reed, 573 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 1978) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972)). Cf. United States v. Burkhalter, 588
F.2d 604, 606-07 (8th Cir. 1978) (Reed distinguished on its facts; revocation appropriate because of probationer's "inability to accept responsibility and to live
within the rules of his probation"). See also Banks v. United States, 614 F.2d
95, 98-101 (6th Cir. 1980); Dicerbo, When Should Probationbe Revoked?, in PnoBATON, PAROLE, AND Comui-rr CoRRE.cToNs 448, 448-58 (2d ed. 1976); Lasker,
Presumption Against Incarceration,7 HoFsTRA L. REV. 407, 407-16 (1979).
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cusable, 8 or the violation was not intentional. 9
Similarly, the American Bar Association (ABA) recommends that probation should not be revoked and a prison sentence reinstated unless the petitioner has either committed
another offense, poses a threat to society, or incarceration is
necessary to demonstrate the authority of the court or the seriousness of the violation.' 0 The ABA standards emphasize,
however, that "intermediate steps should be considered in
every case," including a review and possible adjustment of the
probation conditions, conferences with the probationer, and a
warning that further violations could result in revocation."
Revocation should be avoided whenever possible because
"technical revocations interfere with the policy of the legislature that the use of probation is to be maximized where the
public safety is not endangered."12
The new Minnesota sentencing guidelines were formulated
with a similar concern that revocation decisions "should not be
a reflexive reaction to technical violations."' 3 Because the
guidelines create a presumption against incarceration and in
favor of probation in certain situations,14 the Sentencing Guidelines Commission urged "[g]reat restraint.., in imprisoning
those violating conditions of a stayed sentence."' 5 The Commission concluded that incarceration would be justified when
8. See, e.g., State v. Nakamura, 59 Hawaii 378, 379, 581 P.2d 759, 761 (1978)
(terms of probation violated when probationer made unauthorized ten hour
visit with his mother after the request to make the visit was denied; revocation
reversed on the ground that the drug treatment center had been arbitrary and
the lower court inflexible about considering other programs).
9. See, e.g., Gardner v. State, 365 So.2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(no willful violation when probationer's failure to move from Missouri to Florida pursuant to order of probation officer was due to break down of probationer's car).
10. 3 ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRmAL JUSTIcE, Standard 18-7.3(c), at 508 (2d

ed. 1980).
11. Id., Standard 18-7.3(d), at 508-09.
12. Id. at 516. See also ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRnNmAL JusTICE, STANDARDs RELATING TO PROBATION, Commentary to § 1.2, at 27-30 (Ap-

proved Draft 1970). The ABA noted three advantages to probation:
(1) probation maximizes the liberty and promotes the rehabilitation of the individual "while at the same time vindicating the authority of the law and effectively protecting the public from further violations;" (2 probation is less
expensive than incarceration; and (3) probation "minimizes the impact of the
conviction upon innocent dependents of the offender." Id. Cf. Boyd, An Examination of Probation,20 CRiM. L.Q. 355, 367-79 (1978) (critical discussion of the
policy goals of probation).
13.

MINNESOTA

SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE LEG-

21 (Jan. 1, 1980).
14. Id. at 10-11.
15. Id. at 21.
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the probationer was convicted of a new felony punishable by
imprisonment, or the probationer continued to violate the conditions of his or her probation after intermediate measures
short of imprisonment had been utilized unsuccessfully.16
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Austin, agreed that the
ABA standards for probation revocation struck an appropriate
balance between "the probationer's interest in freedom and the
state's interest in insuring his rehabilitation and the public
safety."17 In order to ensure uniformity in future revocation
hearings, the court directed that prior to revoking probation the
trial court must "1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that need for confinement
outweighs the policies favoring probation."18 The court noted
that "[i]n some cases, policy considerations may require that
probation not be revoked,"19 but asserted that Austin's failure
to show a commitment to rehabilitation indicated that treatment had failed, and that revocation was necessary in order to
assert the authority of the court and emphasize the seriousness
of the violation.20
The Austin court's desire to establish uniform guidelines is
commendable, particularly because the trial court's decision to
revoke probation is discretionary. It is unfortunate, however,
that the court did not more strongly emphasize the need to
consider alternatives short of incarceration in cases involving
mere technical violations of probation. 2 1 As the dissent correctly asserted, alternatives to revocation and incarceration
should have received serious consideration in Austin, particularly because the probationer required drug treatment that was
not available in prison.22 In light of the majority's explicit endorsement of the ABA standards, it is somewhat puzzling that
the court did not recognize that the revocation of Austin's probation was inconsistent with these standards.23 Moreover, the
16. Id.
17. 295 N.W.2d at 250.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. The court failed to indicate whether it advocated the intermediate alternatives to incarceration proposed by the ABA and the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines Commission. For discussion of these intermediate alternatives, see
text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
22. 295 N.W.2d at 252-53 (Otis, J., dissenting).
23. "Revoking appellant's probation under these circumstances belies the
standards to which the majority purports to adhere." Id. at 253.
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Autin decision illustrates the need for even more specific probation revocation guidelines similar to the new sentencing
guidelines. Following the procedure employed in the development of the sentencing guidelines, the legislature should create
a commission that would be charged with developing appropriate criteria for the revocation of probation to ensure that revocation decisions are uniformly and sensibly made.
IV. EVIDENCE
A.

HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY

Marion Erickson was bleeding profusely from a vaginal
wound when police took her from a motel in Minneapolis to a
hospital. Erickson was intoxicated and had no memory of how
she"received the cut. She had been accompanied to the motel
by David Mack, who summoned the ambulance, telling the
drivers that Erickson's bleeding began during sexual intercourse.' Six weeks later police made an appointment for Erickson to visit Beauford Kleidon, a self-taught hypnotist, in hopes
of reviving her memory of a suspected assault. Under hypnosis, 2 Erickson related that Mack cut her with a knife. The following day, Erickson reported to police the events of her
assault as she had recounted them under hypnosis, 3 and as a
result, Mack was arrested and charged with criminal sexual
conduct and aggravated assault. The district court certified to
the Minnesota Supreme Court the question of admissibility of
1. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 1980).
2. Hypnosis has been defined as a "trance-like" state into which the subject is induced and during which the subject is highly susceptible to suggestion.
See Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: is the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHio ST. IJ. 567, 570 (1977). Definitions of hypnosis
range from "a state of heightened suggestibility," see Note, Hypnotism, Suggestibility and the Law, 31 NEB. L. REv. 575, 576 (1952), to "a state in which the critical faculties of the mind are temporarily suspended so that the subject
becomes more readily suggestible," see Note, Hypnosis as an EvidentiaryTool,
8 UTAH L. REV. 78, 79 (1962), to a "highly suggestible state into which a willing
subject is induced by a skilled therapist," see State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 765
n.2. When effective, hypnosis can induce a mental state that facilitates recall
and enables the subject to produce more information than he or she could provide in a waking state, including recall of highly traumatic events. See Haward
& Ashworth, Some Problems of Evidence Obtained by Hypnosis, 1980 CrIM. L.
REV. 469, 474. Hypnosis has been used to ascertain facts from victims of assault
and kidnapping. See, e.g., Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); Haward & Ashworth, supra at 472; Spector &
Foster, supra, at 580.
3. Erickson was given a "post-hypnotic suggestion" so that when she was
no longer in a hypnotic trance she would remember the events she had related
while under hypnosis. 292 N.W.2d at 767.
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hypnotically refreshed testimony.4 The court found such testimony to be inadmissable, holding that a person who had been
previously hypnotized for purposes of memory refreshment
could not testify at a criminal trial on the subject matter adduced at the hypnotic interview. 5 State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764
(Minn. 1980).
Courts that have considered the admissibility of testimony
of previously hypnotized witnesses have not resolved the question uniformly. Concerned with the unreliability of hypnotic
testimony and the uncertain state of the art of hypnosis, 6 one
group of courts has refused to admit hypnotically refreshed testimony. 7 These courts treat hypnosis as a truth ascertaining
device, subject to the test of Frye v. United States,8 which requires that a truth determining device "be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs" 9 before the evidence produced by the device is admissible. Other courts, recognizing hypnosis as an investigatory toollo and as a useful aid to refreshing memory,"1.
have admitted hypnotically refreshed testimony,12 subject to a
4. Id. at 765. The question was raised upon motion of the defendant pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.02(4). The defendant also
asked the court to indicate under What circumstance such testimony, if allowed, would be admissible. Brief for Petitioner at 4, State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764 (Minn. 1980).
5. The court, however, recognized the use of hypnosis as an investigatory
tool and did not foreclose its use out of court. 292 N.W.2d at 777.
6. See, e.g., State v. La Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 551, 611 P.2d 551, 555
(1980) (court did not feel that "the state of the science (or art) has been shown
to be such as to admit testimony which may have been developed as a result of
hypnosis"); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 715-16, 204 S.E.2d 414, 419
(1974) (hypnosis considered akin to drug induced testimony because of the
possibility of invention of false statements under hypnosis).
7. See, e.g., State v. La Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 611 P.2d 511 (1980);
Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); People v. Hangsleben, 273
N.W.2d 539 (Mich. App. 1978).
8. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
9. Id. at 1014. The Minnesota Supreme Court has used the rule established in Frye in determining whether certain evidence would be admissible.
See, e.g., State v. Wakefield, 263 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn. 1978) (polygraph tests);
State v. Goblirsch, 309 Minn. 401, 407, 246 N.W.2d 12, 15 (1976) (polygraph tests).
See also United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975) (test used to
find evidence obtained from polygraph tests inadmissible).
10. See Spector & Foster, supra note 2, at 579-80.
11. See id. at 585-97.
12. Hypnotically refreshed testimony is admitted in several jurisdictions.
See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1006 (1979); United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
People v. Smrekar, 69 11. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); Harding v. State, 5
Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 949 (1968); State v. McQueen,
295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Brom, 8 Or. App. 598, 494 P.2d 434
(1972).
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number of safeguards.13 A third group of courts has admitted
the testimony of a witness whose memory has been refreshed
by hypnosis without requiring compliance with safeguards.
These courts mitigate the problem of witness susceptibility to
suggestion during the hypnotic process by requiring a jury instruction regarding the influence of suggestion, thus enabling4
the jury to weigh the credibility of the testimony accordingly.'
In this case of first impression, the Mack court was concerned with the uncertainties associated with statements made
by persons in a hypnotic state, including the tainting of the testimony by suggestion during hypnosis, the mixture of confabulation with truth in the testimony, and the difficulty of effective
cross-examination of the witness.15 The court treated hypnosis
as a truth ascertaining device to be judged for admissibility according to the Frye test of "acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs."16 Because experts in the field did not agree
on the acceptability of hypnosis as a method for ascertaining
test was not met and the evireliable information, the Frye
7
dence was not admissible.'
The court's decision that Erickson's testimony was inadmissible was correct, but the decision should have been based
on different factors than those discussed in the court's opinion.
Hypnosis in this case was used to refresh the memory 6f a witness who would testify in court from memory. It was not employed as a truth ascertaining device purporting to indicate the
veracity of the witness's testimony.' 8 Although the Frye test
may be an appropriate test of the admissibility of evidence gen13. See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291, 306 (1980).
14. United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1006 (1978) (jury should be aware of the previous hypnosis session); United
States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (jury should decide if testimony of previously hypnotized witness is believable); People v. Smrekar, 68
Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979) (determination that no suggestibility accompanied hypnotic process; therefore, jury must decide if testimony of witness is credible, with expert testimony as to that credibility inadmissible).
15. 292 N.W.2d at 768. See Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of PretrialHypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L REv. 313, 314 (1980) (witness hypnotized for the purpose of having his memory refreshed
"contaminated" and "effectively incompetent to testify"). But see Dilhoff, The
Admissibility of Hypnotically Induced Testimony, 4 OHio N.U.L. REV. 1, 22
(1977) (Diamond approach characterized as "impractical and unrealistic"). See
also Warren & Roberts, Challengingthe Use of Hypnotically Induced Evidence,
9 CoLO.LAw. 1142, 1150 (1980) (juries might give too much weight to testimony
derived from hypnosis).
16. 293 F. at 1014.
17. 292 N.W.2d at 768.
18. 292 N.W.2d at 769. See also Brief for Respondent at 5, State v. Mack, 292
N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
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erated by truth ascertaining devices, it is not an appropriate
test for determining the admissibility of memory refreshing devices such as the hypnosis at issue in Mack. The test for the
former attempts to measure the accuracy of the device itself as
an indicator of truth; the test for the latter should indicate the
reliability with which the memory refreshing device elicits accurate testimony, but the testimony itself should be weighed
for credibility by the factfinder as other disputed testimony is
weighed.19
The danger of unreliable testimony,20 the difficulty of effective cross-examination, and the possibility that undue weight
will be given by juries to hypnotically refreshed testimony
could be allayed by requiring that certain safeguards be satisfied before the testimony is admitted. Effective safeguards for
minimizing the danger of -unreliability of the testimony were
outlined during the Mack hearing,2 1 and have been discussed
19. See, e.g., Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969) (jury instructed to weigh carefully testimony of previously hypnotized witness). See also United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978) ("present-recolection-refreshed" concept is applicable to pretrial hypnosis in criminal cases as well as civil cases);
State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978) (testimony of previously
hypnotized witness should be questioned as to its credibility, not its admissibility); State v. Brom, 8 Or. App. 598, 494 P.2d 434 (1972) (testimony of previously
hypnotized witness admissible in murder case since witness did undergo incourt cross-examination). See also Spector & Foster, supra note 2, at 586; National Legal Aid & Defenders Association Governing Board, Resolution on the
Forensic Use of Hypnosis Passed, February 3, 1980, 37 NLADA BREFCASE 12
(1980) [hereinafter cited as National Legal Aid & Defenders Resolution].
20. Hypnosis is by no means a precise science. See Orne, Hypnosis and
Victim/Witness Recall, 37 NLADA BRIEFCASE 6 (1980). Recall after hypnosis
may not accurately reflect historical events. The subject may combine several
experiences believing them to be part of a single happening. In addition, although hypnosis increases recall, it also increases confabulation-filling in
"gaps" and unconsciously manufacturing "memories," using whatever information was previously available to the individual. Id. at 7. Moreover, the subject
in a hypnotic trance is in a very heightened state of suggestibility and may be
influenced by a hypnotist trying to verify a theory of the crime, even if the hypnotist does not consciously attempt to exert influence over the subject. See
Haward & Ashworth, supra note 2, at 476; Orne, supra, at 8; Spector & Foster,
supra note 2, at 591. As a result, without independent verification, it is difficult,
if not impossible, to tell if the subject's statements represent augmented recall,
or whether the subject's memory has been altered in accordance with suggestions he or she has received. Haward & Ashworth, supra note 2, at 475; Orne,
supra, at 10. Furthermore, after hypnotic memory refreshing, the subject may
"recall" the event with strong conviction, refusing to change the story. Thus,
although there is agreement that hypnosis can enhance recall, State v. Hurd,
173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291 (1980), the nature of the art is such that it is
difficult to sort out actual recall and other perception.
21. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 771 n.14.
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by commentators. 22 The suggested safeguards call for hypnosis
sessions conducted by an independent psychiatrist or psychologist who is trained in hypnosis and apprised of the case in an
unbiased manner. Only the subject and hypnotist are to be
present at the sessions, and a video-taped record must be kept.
The witness should testify at trial from present memory and
should be subject to cross-examination; any facts elicited as a
result of the hypnotic interview should be corroborated by
other evidence. Finally, the jury should be given a forceful instruction regarding the limited role of hypnosis as a memory
aid and not as an indicator of absolute truth.
Because the appropriate safeguards were not employed
during Erickson's hypnosis session,23 the Mack court was correct in ruling that her hypnotically refreshed testimony was
inadmissible. Exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testimony
because hypnosis does not meet the Frye test, however, unnecessarily eliminates a useful tool that can be adequately controlled for danger and uncertainty. The Mack decision should
be confined to the particularly unreliable circumstances of the
Mack case itself and the court should develop a test based
upon the proposed safeguards as appropriate cases arise.
V. TAXATION
A.

DISCRIMINATORY PROPERTY

TAX ASSESSMENT

United National Corporation owned and operated a suburban shopping center in St. Louis Park, Minnesota. In 1978, the
corporation decided to contest past property tax valuations on
the ground that the property had been assessed unequally in
comparison to other properties in the same district.' As evi22. See generally Spector & Foster, supra note 2, at 586; National Legal Aid
& Defenders Resolution, supra note 19; Amicus Curiae Brief at 23, State v.
Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (1980); Orne, supra note 20.

23. The hypnotist was not professionally trained. In addition to the hypnotist and Erickson, two policemen attended the hypnotic session; representatives of the defendant were neither present nor aware of the session.
Precautions against suggestion to the subject were not employed. Although an

audio tape recording of the session was made, it was subsequently lost. Erickson's statements at the trial were not corroborated by other evidence. 292
N.W.2d at 767, 772.
1. Minnesota Statutes § 273.11 requires that all property be valued for tax
purposes at its market value. MmN. STAT. § 273.11(1) (1980). Unequal assessment occurs when a taxpayer's property is valued for tax purposes at a substantially higher percentage of its market value than is other property. Thus,
unequal assessment can occur even when the taxpayer is assessed at less than
100% of market value. See generally Kilmer, The Legal Requirementsfor Equal-
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dence of unequal assessment, the taxpayer introduced a sales
ratio study,2 which compared the assessed value and sales
prices for 38 commercial properties sold in St. Louis Park during the three years in issue. The study indicated a range in the
assessment-sales ratios of 38% to 222%.3 The Minnesota
Supreme Court held that even if there was no intentional discrinination, the taxpayer could establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory assessment if it could show that other properties had been arbitrarily or systematically undervalued in relation to the taxpayer's own property.4 The court affirmed the
lower court decision against United National, however, on the
ground that the taxpayer's sales ratio study failed to show the
existence of systematic or arbitrary underassessment. United
National Corp. v. County of Hennepin, 299 N.W.2d 73 (Minn.
1980).
In a second case the owner of a home valued in excess of
$200,000 also challenged assessment on the ground of inequality. The home owner, Malcolm McCannel, introduced the testimony of an appraiser with the Minneapolis assessor's office
ity in Tax Assessments, 25 ALB. L. REV. 203 (1961); Koeppel, Inequality in Real
Property Tax Review, 19 BuFFALO L. REV.565 (1970); Note, Inequality in Property Tax Assessments: New Curesfor an Old Ill, 75 HARv. L, REV. 1374 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Inequality]. For a comprehensive survey of state
laws, see Beebe & Sinnott, In the Wake of Hellerstein: Whither New York? (pts.
1-3), 43 ALB. L. REV. 203, 411, 777 (1979). For a discussion of Minnesota law regarding unequal assessment, see Note, Grounds and Proceduresfor Attacking
Real Property Tax Assessments in Minnesota, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 371, 38398 (1978).
2. A sales ratio study consists of a sample of recently sold properties from
which assessment-sales ratios are computed. An assessment-sales ratio is the
ratio of the property's assessed value to its sales price. Sale price serves as a
convenient substitute for fair market value. In Minnesota, as elsewhere, assessors keep records of the sale prices of all properties. Taxpayers typically use
these records as the data base for their studies. The Minnesota Supreme Court
described briefly how to compute and use the assessment ratio in a recent case.
See Anacker v. County of Cottonwood, 302 N.W.2d 342, 343-44 (Minn. 1981). See
generally INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, IMPROVING
REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS 89-162 (1978) [hereinafter cited as IMPROVING ASSESSMENTS].

3.

See Letter from Attorney John A. Murray to Justice Sheran (January 7,

1980).
4. United National Corp. v. County of Hennepin, 299 N.W.2d 73, 76 (Minn.
1980). This standard originated in Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1918), and was adopted as Minnesota law in Harm v.
State, 255 Minn. 64, 70, 95 N.W.2d 649, 654-55 (1959).
The discriminatory assessment may be deemed a violation of the federal
constitution, see U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; the Minnesota constitution, MINN.
CONsT. art. 10, § 1 ('Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects. . . ."); or a Minnesota statute, MINN. STAT. § 278.01(1) (1980) ("Any person.., who claims that [his or her] property has been partially, unfairly, or
unequally assessed... may have the validity of [the] claim.
determined by
the district court ... or by the tax court .... ).
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that the appraised value of homes in excess of $100,000 had not
been increased as rapidly as those of other homes.5 McCannel
also introduced evidence showing that ten homes in his neighborhood worth over $100,000 were assessed at an average of
63% of their sale prices, as opposed to the McCannel property,
which was assessed at 100% of market value.6 The Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the deliberate treatment of houses
valued at more than $100,000 with a special method of assessment was the kind of arbitrary and systematic discrimination
prohibited by the state constitution and the Minnesota Statutes.7 The taxpayer would be entitled to relief on remand if he
could show that other houses valued over $100,000 were substantially undervalued in relation to his own, 8 and the proper
measure of that relief would be a reduction of the taxpayer's
assessed value to the average percentage of market value at
which other properties in the same class are assessed.9 McCannel v. County of Hennepin, 301 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1980).
Although Minnesota law requires that all property be valued for tax purposes at full market value,' 0 properties are actually valued at varying percentages of their market values due to
a number of factors. First, divergent property assessment can
be the result of an intentional policy by assessors." Such a
policy may arise from political pressure' 2 to favor a certain
type of property, a dnd of property owner, or even the property
of a particular individual.13 Or, it may be due to an assessor's
own notions about which properties ought to bear a larger tax
5. This was apparently done under the good faith but erroneous assumption that these properties were not inflating in value as fast as other homes.
See McCannel v. County of Hennepin, 301 N.W.2d 910, 920-21 (Minn. 1980).
6. Id. at 921.
7. See note 4 supra.
8. 301 N.W.2d at 921.
9. The taxpayer also argued that various pieces of legislation instituting
the "limited market value" concept in property assessments were unconstitutional, see 1975 Minn. Laws, ch. 437, art. 8, § 5; 1973 Minn. Laws, ch. 650, art. 23,
but the court held this legislation constitutional. See 301 N.W.2d at 919.
10. See note 1 supra.
11. See, e.g., Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 21, 132 N.W.2d 394, 405
(1964) (assessor intentionally applied different ratios to market value of property of the same class). The case is discussed in Note, The Minnesota Supreme
Court 1964-65, 50 MiNN. L. REV. 479, 551-58 (1966).
12. One commentator has noted that with regard to Minnesota assessments, "[blecause of the decentralization of administration and consequent
lack of supervision, traditionally local assessors have been an easy target for
local political pressures." RAMSEY COUNTIY LEAGUE OF MuNicIPALIrEs, PRoposALS FOR THE REFORM OF PROPERTY TAx ASSESSMENT IN MINNESOTA 15 (1970).

13. See, e.g., Ploetz v. County of Hennepin, 301 Minn. 410, 412, 223 N.W.2d
761, 762-63 (1974) (taxpayer alleged property of mayor treated favorably).
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burden.14 A second cause of unequal assessments is the practice of reassessing the properties in a single tax district in
piecemeal fashion over several years, rather than all at once in
the same year. In a time of inflating property values, properties
that are reassessed earlier will tend to be assessed at a higher
percentage of market value than those'that have yet to be reassessed. 5 The actions of inexperienced, nonprofessional assessors who make poor initial estimates of market value are a
third source of inequality. Finally, there is the phenomenon
known as "assessment lag,"'

6

which results when properties

are not reassessed often enough and the varying effects of inflation and changing neighborhood conditions exacerbate disparities in the ratios of assessed value to market value. Whenever
these factors result in an unequal distribution of the tax burden, the equal protection clause of the federal constitution, the
uniformity clause of the state constitution, and the state statute
prohibiting unequal taxation may be implicated.' 7
In order to recover for discriminatory taxation under the
equal protection clause of the federal constitution, the taxpayer
must show "something which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the essential principle of practical uniformity."' 8 The majority of states have incorporated this federal

"intentional" standard into decisions interpreting their own
uniformity clauses. 19 A growing minority of states, however, do
not require a showing of intent in actions brought under their
uniformity clauses. 2 0 The taxpayer may recover simply by
14. See, e.g., Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 7, 132 N.W.2d 394, 399
(1964).
15. See, e.g., Ploetz v. County of Hennepin, 301 Minn. 410, 411-12, 223
N.W.2d 761, 762 (1974) (taxpayer alleged discrimination due to policy of sequential reassessment).
16. See generally D. PAL, THE PoLrTIcs OF THE PROPERTY TAX 32, 34

(1975).
17. See Manvel, Slippage in Assessment Uniformity, 8 TAx NOTES 44
(1979); note 4 supra.
18. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 353
(1918). This has been held to occur, for example, when the assessor intentionally uses a different method to assess other property in the same class, Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 37 (1907), or when the assessor
arbitrarily assigns the same assessment value to properties having different
true values, Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax Assessments, 284
U.S. 23, 29-30 (1931).
19. See, e.g., County of Maricopa v. North Cent. Dev. Co., 115 Ariz. 540, 543,
566 P.2d 688, 691 (1977); Kittery Elec. Light Co. v. Assessors of Kittery, 219 A-2d
728, 739 (Me. 1966); Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 278 Md. 659, 670,
366 A.2d 369, 375 (1976).
20. See, e.g., Lerner Shops of Conn., Inc. v. Town of Waterbury, 151 Conn.
79, 86-87, 193 A.2d 472, 476-77 (1963); Tregor v. Board of Assessors, 387 N.E.2d
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proving a substantial disparity between the assessment ratio
21
applicable to his or her property and that applicable to others.
Only the minority's "disparity" standard of proof potentially
provides relief for all four of the sources of assessment inequality.22

The second major issue in unequal assessment cases is the
proper measure of relief. A few courts reduce the taxpayer's
assessment to a level set by statute.23 This solution promotes
the policy of inter-district uniformity, but generally does not
provide the taxpayer with as much compensation as the other
methods. 24 Another group of courts reduce the taxpayer's assessment to the lowest level enjoyed by others in the district.25
This measure of relief has been criticized as giving the taxpayer a windfall, exacerbating assessment inequality, and endangering the local tax base.2 6 Most courts reduce the
taxpayer's assessment to a level corresponding to the average
for the district. This average figure may be represented by the
median assessment ratio,2 7 the weighted mean,2 8 the un538, 540 (Mass. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979); Piscataway Assoc., Inc. v.
Township of Piscataway, 73 N.J. 546, 550, 376 A.2d 527, 529 (1977); Deitch Co. v.
Board of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review, 417 Pa. 213, 220, 209 A.2d 397, 401

(1965).
21. The taxpayer may prove the element of disparity, which is necessary
under both the majority and minority approaches, in at least three ways:
(1) have a private assessor assess several neighboring properties and calculate
their assessment ratios, see, e.g., Tilsac Corp. v. Assessor of Huntington, 55
Misc. 2d 431, 432-40, 285 N.Y.S.2d 533, 534-42 (Sup. Ct. 1967); (2) rely on assessment ratios computed in a state-sponsored study, see, e.g., Tri-Terminal Corp. v.
Borough of Edgewater, 68 N.J. 405, 408, 346 A.2d 396, 398 (1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 958 (1976); or (3) conduct a sales ratio study, see note 2 supra, the method
employed in both of the present cases. See generally 0. OLDMNi & F. ScHOETTLE, STATE AND LocAL TAXEs AND FINANCE 275-89 (1974).
22. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
23. See, e.g., Gordon v. Hiett, 214 Kan. 690, 695, 552 P.2d 942, 947 (1974).
24. Often, the taxpayer will be starting with an assessment ratio already
below the statutory level, but will argue that relief is due on grounds that
others are still lower. In such cases, the statutory remedy provides no relief at
all
25. See, e.g., Board of Assessors v. Curtis, 375 Mass. 493, 501, 378 N.E.2d 655,
660 (1978); Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 21, 132 N.W.2d 394, 408
(1964); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Young, 60 S.D. 291, 297, 244 N.W. 370, 373 (1932).
26. See, e.g., Note, Inequality,supra note 1, at 1391-92.
27. The median is statistically the most attractive choice as a measure of
central tendency in this context because it is not greatly affected by the presence of outlying observations. The computation of the median and its statistical properties is presented in bs-Rovmn AsSESSMENTS, supra note 2, at 124-25.
Despite its attractiveness, courts have generally overlooked the median as an
indicator of average assessment ratio.
28. The weighted mean reflects the average assessment ratio on a dollar
for dollar basis. It is computed by dividing the sum total assessed value for all
properties by the sum total sales (or market) value. Thus, it is influenced by
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weighted mean,29 or the mode, 30 although there is no clear con31
sensus as to which statistical indicator is most appropriate.
Prior to United National and McCannel, Minnesota was in
the majority as to the standard of proof, and in the minority as
to the measure of relief. In 1959, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held in Hamm v. State32 that it was necessary to show "systematic, arbitrary, or intentional undervaluation of some property

as compared to the valuation of other property," but the court
also cited with approval language from federal case law suggesting that something tantamount to intent was required for
any cause of action. 33 The question of the proper measure of
relief, left open in Hamm, was determined in Dulton Realty,
more expensive properties to a greater extent than by less expensive ones. See
IMPROVING ASSESSMENTS, supra note 2, at 126-27. Its appropriateness as a
measure of overall assessment performance is debatable. One commentator
has shown that the use of the weighted mean will tend to give an advantage to
the owners of expensive property. See Rosett, Inequity in the Real Property
Tax of New York State and the AggravatingEffects of Litigation, 23 NAT'L TAX
J. 66, 70-72 (1970). Nevertheless, some courts have used or endorsed the use of
the weighted mean for this purpose. See Bemis Bros. Co. v. Claremont, 98 N.H.
446, 452, 102 A.2d 512, 516 (1954); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. County Assessor, 92
N.M. 609, 614, 592 P.2d 965, 970 (1978).
29. The unweighted mean reflects the average assessment ratio on a property by property basis. It is computed by summing the individual assessment
ratios and dividing by their number. Although arguably more appropriate as a
measure of overall assessment performance than the weighted mean, it is more
influenced by skewness than is the median, and when applied to sales data, is a
statistically biased indicator of the mean ratio of true market value. See IMPROVING AsSESSMENTS, supra note 2, at 126; Cheng, The Common Level of Assessment in Property Taxation, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 50, 52-59 (1970). The
unweighted mean has been applied or endorsed by courts in several cases. See,
e.g., State v. Kennedy, 52 Ala. App. 470, 476, 294 So.2d 439, 443 (Civ. App. 1974);
Tri-Terminal Corp. v. Borough of Edgewater, 68 N.J. 405, 413 n.4, 346 A-2d 396,
400 nA (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976).
30. The mode is the single ratio appearing most frequently in the group of
properties sampled. Its use is endorsed by Cheng, supra note 29, at 64, but one
of its drawbacks is that it requires a large number of observations.
31. The Minnesota Supreme Court itself appears uncertain as to whether
to rely on the weighted or unweighted mean. In United National, the court
faulted the plaintiff for not having "weight[ed] the figures to account for differences in value." United National Corp. v. County of Hennepin, 299 N.W.2d 73,
75 (Minn. 1980). In the McCannel decision, however, the court made no objection to the use of unweighted figures. See 301 N.W.2d at 921-22.
Many courts have rendered decisions based on the use of mean ratios without specifying whether they were referring to weighted or unweighted means.
See, e.g., Koblenz v. Board of Revision, 5 Ohio St. 2d 214, 215-16, 215 N.E.2d 384,
386-87 (1966); Deitch Co. v. Board of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review, 417
Pa. 213, 220-21, 209 A.2d 397, 401 (1965); Baken Park, Inc. v. County of Pennington, 79 S.D. 156, 164-65, 109 N.W.2d 898, 902 (1961). But see In re Appeals of
Kents 2124 Ati. Ave., Inc., 34 N.J. 21, 32, 166 A.2d 763, 769 (1961) (explicitly considers both weighted and unweighted means).
32. 255 Minn. 64, 95 N.W.2d 649 (1959).
33. Id. at 69, 95 N.W.2d at 654.

1981]

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

1095

Inc. v. State34 to be a reduction to the lowest assessment ratio
applied by the assessor for any class of property within the tax35
ing district.
In United National the court held that it was not necessary
to prove that the assessor intended to produce unequal and discriminatory taxation; systematic or arbitrary undervaluation
would also be actionable. 3 6 The court argued that the Hamm
requirement of intent was mere dictum and was not compelled
by the federal constitution.3 7 Furthermore, the court noted that
recent Minnesota Tax Court decisions had already dispensed
with the intent criterion. 38 Although the court abandoned the
intent requirement, it neither chose to follow the minority
states and allow recovery on a simple showing of substantial
disparity,39 nor explicate a clear intermediate standard.40
In McCannel, the court attempted to clarify this standard,
holding that the deliberate treatment of some properties with a
special method of assessment that results in substantial undervaluation was arbitrary or systematic discrimination. 41 The
court concluded that the assessor's policy of assessing homes
valued at over $100,000 differently from other properties
amounted to deliberate underassessment, but that McCannel
had failed to prove that these properties were substantially undervalued in relation to his own. The court stated that, if the
taxpayer prevailed on remand, the proper measure of his recovery would be a reduction in assessment commensurate with
the average ratio for other properties in the same class. 42 Although the court rejected the previous rule, which measured
recovery by the difference between the taxpayer's assessment
ratio and the assessment ratio enjoyed by the most favored
group of properties in the district,43 it suggested that the more
34. 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964).
35. Id. at 21, 132 N.W.2d at 408. The taxing district was defined as the municipality, not the county.
36. 299 N.W.2d at 76.
37. The court traced the Hamm dictum back to United States Supreme
Court decisions and said that the requirement of purposeful discrimination
served the ends of federal-state comity by not allowing too many state taxpayers to recover in federal courts. Id. at 76 n.3.
38. See Pillsbury Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, No. 2578 (Minn. T.C.
1980); Northland Land Co. v. County of Dakota, No. 83469 (Minn. T.C. 1978).
39. 299 N.W.2d at 77. For examples of the minority position, see cases cited
in note 20 supra.
40. 299 N.W.2d at 77.
41. 301 N.W.2d at 921.
42. Id. at 922.
43. See Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 21, 132 N.W.2d 394, 408
(1964).
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generous measure of recovery would still apply when the appraiser intentionally discriminates in assessments. 44
In McCannel and United National, the court attempted to
steer a middle course between the federal requirement of intentional discrimination and the minority standard of simple
disparity in assessment.45 The court's definition of arbitrary or
systematic discrimination is ambiguous, however, and may not
actually amount to anything different from the intentional standard.46 The court should have followed the minority and recognized a cause of action under the state's uniformity clause
whenever the taxpayer can point to a substantial disparity between his or her own assessment ratio and that of other taxpayers. This approach has the advantage of extending relief to
taxpayers who are adversely affected by extrinsic factors, such
as assessment lag,47 or who are the victims of a singular,
though substantial assessment error. It would also provide relief in those instances in which the disparity is the product of
many years of neglect of the taxrolls, with the assessment ratios showing no tendency to cluster systematically. 48 Although
the disparity standard places considerable reliance on sales ratio studies and attendant statistical testimony, this is also the
case with the federal intentional standard.49 Futhermore, there
is no indication that a flood of litigation has resulted in the
states that have adopted the disparity standard.
Regardless of whether the court relies on its current stan44. See 301 N.W.2d at 922 n.8.
45. See id. at 921; United National Corp. v. County of Hennepin, 299 N.W.2d
at 77.
46. The federal standard does not require bad faith on the part of the assessor to prove intent to discriminate. See Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of
Revision of Tax Assessments, 284 U.S. 23, 25 (1931). It is sufficient to show
"something which in effect amounts to an intentional violation of the principle
of practical uniformity." Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247
U.S. 350, 353 (1918). In McCannel, the court stated that "deliberate" use of a
special assessment method resulting in substantial undervaluation amounted
to arbitrary or systematic discrimination. 301 N.W.2d at 921. It is difficult to see
why this would not be sufficient for a cause of action under the federal standard. See Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax Assessments, 284
U.S. at 25, 29-30.
47. See text accompanying note 16 supra. Since inequality induced by inflation or changing neighborhoods is not necessarily related to deliberate conduct by an assessor, the court's current standard would not provide relief for
assessment lag regardless of the size of the disparity.
48. This may have been the situation in United National, where commercial properties were assessed at a wide range of levels. See text accompanying
note 3 supra.
49. See, e.g., Kittery Elec. Light Co. v. Assessors of Kittery, 219 A.2d 728,
742 (Me. 1966).

1981]

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

1097

dard or adopts the minority approach, the taxpayer must prove
that there is a substantial disparity between the level at which
he or she is assessed and the level at which others are assessed. In McCannel, the court pointed to the difference between the taxpayer's assessment ratio and the average ratio for
the group of homes valued at over $100,000,50 but the preferable
method would have been to compare the taxpayer's assessment
ratio with the average 51 ratio for all properties in the district.52
Minnesota law requires that all property be assessed at full
market value, 53 and equality demands that if properties are assessed at less than full market value, each property should be
undervalued by the same percentage. The problem with the
court's suggested approach to determining undervaluation in
McCannel is that it would be possible for the taxpayer to gain
relief if his property is less favorably assessed than other
homes valued at $100,000 even if his property is more favorably
assessed than the average for the district.54 The court's suggested approach may promote equality in the distribution of
the tax burden among owners of homes valued in excess of
$100,000, but not among property owners as a whole.5 5 A final
reason for favoring the total average as the benchmark for determining substantial inequality is that it is consistent with the
preferred measure of relief: reduction of the taxpayer's assess-

ment ratio to the total average level for the

district.56

The McCannel court elected as a remedy a reduction of the
50. See 301 N.W.2d at 921.
51. The preferable measure of this average point would be the median.
See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Deitch Co. v. Board of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review,
417 Pa. 213, 223, 209 A.2d 397, 402 (1965).
53. MINN. STAT. § 273.11(1) (1980).
54. The court has apparently confused the use of comparable properties to
estimate the actual market value of the subject property with the use of comparable properties to compare assessment ratios. In the former use, the properties used for comparison must clearly be similar to the subject property. If the
subject property is a house, the comparables must be of approximately the
same size, located in similar neighborhoods and of similar age. For the latter
purpose, however, where the taxpayer is merely computing in percentage
terms how close to market value other properties are assessed, any property
may be regarded as comparable. The Minnesota Supreme Court is not the first
to make this mistake. See Mason v. Board of Review, 250 Iowa 291, 295, 93
N.W.2d 732, 734 (1958) (other properties which were not fire-proofed held not
comparable for purposes of proof of unequal assessment).
55. See also Robinson v. Stewart, 216 Or. 532, 536-37, 339 P.2d 432, 434-35
(1959). See generally Note, Inequality, supra note 1, at 1390-91.
56. This is desirable because otherwise there might be illegal inequality,
but no form of relief. The United States Supreme Court held in Sioux City
Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441,446-47 (1923), that it is impermissible
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taxpayer's assessment to the average for the group of similar,
$100,000 homes. As the court recognized, the measure of relief
established in DultonS 7-reducing the taxpayer's assessment
ratio to the level of the most favored individual or group-has
serious drawbacks. Because there will often be some properties that are assessed absurdly low, this measure of relief conveys a windfall to the litigating taxpayer, thus exacerbating
inequality and increasing unfairness to taxpayers who are assessed at or about the average for all properties. Not only is
this unfair, but it also provides an incentive for plaintiffs to litigate that may overburden the courts. The McCannel court
therefore endorsed the remedy of reducing the taxpayer's assessment ratio to the average for the group of $100,000 homes.
Since these homes are apparently assessed below the total average, 58 however, the effect of this solution in this case is similar to the Dulton approach: the court is compounding one
underassessment with another, increasing inequality in the tax
district, and giving the litigant too great a reward. Thus, both
for purposes of determining whether a substantial disparity in
assessment existed and for calculating relief, if any, the McCannel court should have remanded for evidence on the total average assessment ratio for all property in the district.59
to deny all practical relief to a taxpayer who is injured by discriminatory assessments.
Another important advantage inherent in recognizing that all properties in
a district are relevant in determining whether there has been unequal taxation
pertains to the development of sales ratio studies. In both United National and
McCannel, the court held the taxpayer's sales ratio studies inadequate for two
primary reasons: insufficient sample, and the indiscriminate use of sale price
as a proxy for market value. Given the court's restrictive interpretation of the
taxpayer's "class," and the fact that in Minnesota the taxing district is the municipality, rather than the county, there will be many instances when it will not
be possible to collect a sufficient sample for the study-there will simply not be
enough sales of a specific kind of property in a given year. By recognizing that
all properties may be used in the study, however, the potential sample increases greatly. A larger sample would not only solve the problem of statistical
significance, it would also mitigate the inaccuracies associated with using sales
prices as proxies for true market value because sale prices tend to fluctuate
randomly around the mean of fair market value of properties. As the number
of transactions increases, this mean fair market value becomes fixed with
greater certainty. See generally Cheng, supra note 29, at 54-55.
57. 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964).
58. This inference is drawn from the testimony that the appraised values
of the $100,000 homes were not increased as rapidly as those of other homes
during the years in question. See 301 N.W.2d at 920.
59. If it is determined that the taxpayer is assessed substantially above the
level of other homes valued over $100,000, yet below the average level for all
properties, the appropriate form of relief would be a procedure compelling the
assessor to raise the assessment levels of the $100,000 homes to the total average. See Note, Inequality, upra note 1, at 1391.
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VI. TORTS
A.

BYSTANDER RECOVERY

On a September evening in 1975, Mrs. Stadler was conversing with a friend in a park a few yards from a road. Her fiveyear old son was with her and wished to cross the road to play.
Mrs. Stadler gave him permission to do so. A few seconds later
she heard the sound of screeching brakes and turned to see her
son fly through the air and hit the pavement. Her husband was
expecting his wife and child to join him in the park that evening but he was unaware that they had arrived. Although he
did not witness the accident, Mr. Stadler was nearby when it
occurred, and ran to the scene when he heard the noise. Only
then did he realize that his son was involved. The boy was not
killed, but suffered severe brain damage. Mr. and Mdrs. Stadler
brought suit against the negligent driver, alleging that they suffered emotional and mental distress with resultant physical
symptoms from witnessing the accident. The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that bystanders who witness negligently
caused injury to another and as a result suffer mental distress
with physical symptoms do not have a valid cause of action unless they too were within the zone of danger and feared for
their own safety. Stadlerv. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980).
Courts are divided as to whether and under what circumstances a bystander should be allowed to recover for mental
distress caused by witnessing injury to another.1 A handful of
states still maintain the old "impact" standard,2 which requires
that the plaintiff allege that he or she suffered some physical
1. The academic commentators, on the other hand, are virtually unanimous in their preference for the Dillon standard, described in text accompanying notes 6-8 infra. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54
(4th ed. 1971); Joseph, Dillon's Other Leg: The Extension of the Doctrine Which
Permits Bystander Recovery for Emotional Trauma and PhysicalInjuriesto Actions Based on Strict Liability in Tort, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 22 (1979); Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to
Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 165 (1976); Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander:
The TranscontinentalDispute Between Californiaand New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 1, 39 (1976). But see Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Recognized as Independent Tort, 29 DEF. L.J. 424, 430 (1980).
2. See Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So.2d 816, 819 (Fla. 1977);
App. 3d 521, 523, 361 N.E.2d 91, 93 (1977);
Benza v. Shulman Air Freight, 46 Ill.
Boston v. Cheasapeake & 0. Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 430, 61 N.E.2d 326, 328 (1945); Hetrick v. Willis, 439 S.W.2d 942, 943 (Ky. 1969); Williams v. School Dist. of Springfield R-12, 447 S.W.2d 256, 266 (Mo. 1969).
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impact from the negligent force. The majority of states 3 have
abandoned this standard for a "zone of danger" test which does
not require that the bystander suffer a physical impact, but4
only that he or she be within the zone of physical danger.
With only a few exceptions, states adhering to these standards
base the bystander's right to recover upon fear for his or her
own safety, rather than fear for another person.5 A growing minority of states, 6 following the California Supreme Court's decision in Dillon v. Legg,7 have rejected the "zone of danger" test
in favor of a less mechanical approach. Rather than simply
concluding that the bystander outside of the zone of danger is
an unforeseeable plaintiff, the Dillon court held that the foreseeability of a bystander's mental distress must be determined
on a case-by-case basis. In a Dillon analysis three factors are
typically considered: the bystander's physical proximity to the
accident, whether the bystander directly observed the incident,
and whether the bystander and the victim were closely related.8 When all three conditions are satisfied, the plaintiff may

recover for mental distress resulting in physical symptoms.
Prior to Stadler, the Minnesota Supreme Court had not
ruled on a case involving the mental distress of a person
outside of the zone of danger who witnessed negligently-inflicted injury to another. The court, however, had held that a
3. See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979); Tobin v.
Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 947 (1935).
4. The usual formulation of the test is that the plaintiff must be within
the zone of physical danger and have feared for his or her own safety. A defendant owes no duty to anyone outside of that area. See, e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 947 (1935).
5. Some courts have used the zone of danger standard to allow recovery
for distress due to fear for another. See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 116,
593 P.2d 668, 670 (1979); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933).
6. Currently, these states include California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas. See Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Leong v. Takasaki, 55
Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Dziokonski v. Badineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380
N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Portee v.
Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672
(1979); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.L 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Landreth v.
Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1978). See also Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424,
553 P.2d 1096 (1976).
In addition, a Michigan appellate court has followed Dillon. Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973). In Connecticut, the lower
courts have split. Compare D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp.
164, 326 A.2d 129 (Super. Ct. 1973) with McGovern v. Piccolo, 33 Conn. Supp.
225, 372 A.2d 989 (Super. Ct. 1976).
7. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
8. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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person within the zone of danger and fearing for his or her own
safety may recover for emotional distress when physical injury
resulted.9 In Stadler, the court explicitly rejected the Dillon
rule in favor of the zone of danger test. The court viewed the
zone of danger test as having the virtues of simplicity, certainty, and objectivity, characterizing the Dillon standard, on
the other hand, as incapable of being consistently and meaningfully applied by courts and juries. Applying the zone of danger test, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal because
the Stadlers were clearly outside of the zone of danger when
the accident occurred.' 0
The Stadler court's criticism of Dillon focused on two specific objections. First, the court indicated that the Dillon crite-

ria, even if they were to remain unchanged, would yield
arbitrary results because of their inability to circumscribe the
area of liability." The requirements of physical proximity and
direct perception of the accident would appear, for example, to
deny recovery to a parent who happened upon the scene a
short time after the event, even though the parent's distress
could be as great as the distress of the parent who was nearby
and directly witnessed the accident. Similarly, the requirement
of a close familial relationship could mean that a fiance or a
life-long friend would not be able to recover 12 even though that
person's relationship with the victim could be as close as a family member's. Although these arguments may be grounds for
9. See Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969);
Purcell v. St. Paul Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). The Minnesota
Supreme Court, in Purcell, was the first to allow recovery in a purely negligent
situation for injury due to fright in the absence of a physical impact. The court
had not, however, allowed recovery for a person who was not personally endangered when witnessing an intentional wrong to another, see Sanderson v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 88 Minn. 162, 92 N.W. 542 (1902), or for a person who did not
personally witness an accident, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Village of
Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36 (1963).
10. Mr. and Mrs. Stadler believed that they both would receive recovery
under the Dillon rule. Mr. Stadler's recovery would depend on whether the Dillon test is interpreted to require that the witness visually observe the accident
while it is happening, or whether it would be sufficient to hear the accident, immediately rush to the scene, and then view the injured victim. In Dillon, the
California Supreme Court stated that recovery would depend on "[w]hether
the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance -of-the accident, as contrasted with
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence." Dillon v. Legg, 68
Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
11. 295 N.W.2d at 554-55.
12. See, e.g. Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980)
(declining to extend recovery to "de facto spouses" who had lived together for
three years). But cf. Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573,
127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976) (foster parent allowed recovery).
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adopting a rule more liberal than the Dillon standard, it seems
questionable to point to the arbitrary limits of recovery under
Dillon as a reason for adopting the more restrictive zone of
danger standard.
Second, the Stadler court may have been concerned that,
because the Dillon criteria impose seemingly arbitrary limits
on recovery, a succession of difficult cases could erode all three
criteria, allowing a much broader range of recovery. An uncertain standard of liability would then arise, but more importantly, the court would be unable to keep certain cases from
the jury through the use of a summary judgment.13 In California, however, where Dillon is now thirteen years old, there has
been no appreciable erosion of the three criteria.14 The California experience and the desirability of providing recovery to
plaintiffs such as the Stadlers, support the adoption of the Dillon rule, despite the possibility that some increase in the
number of suits brought by witnesses of negligently caused in-

juries may result.
B. LIABILTY OF PARENT TO CHILD
Two-year-old Breeanna Anderson asked her parents if she
could go outside and play. She was granted permission, but
was told to stay in the back of the house. About ten or fifteen
minutes later a neighbor, Edna Stream, backed her car down
the common driveway between the Stream and Anderson residences and ran over Breeanna's leg. Edward Anderson, as
guardian of his daughter and in an individual capacity, sued the
Streams for the injuries. The defendants cross-claimed against
Anderson and his wife for contribution and indemnity but the

parents moved for summary judgment against the neighbors,
alleging that no right of contribution existed due to the doctrine of parental immunity. The district court granted the parents' motion, and the defendants appealed.' In a similar case,
James Nuessle and his three-year-old son went on an errand to
a drugstore. Several seconds after entering the store Nuessle
missed his son and saw him crossing the street alongside an
adult male. In a state of panic, Nuessle hurried outside and,
without looking for traffic, called for his son. The child turned
around, started back toward his father, and was struck by an
13. The Stadler case itself was disposed of at the trial court level by summary judgment.
14. See, e.g., Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980).
1. 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
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automobile. In the son's action for damages against his father,
the father moved for summary judgment on the ground of parental immunity. The trial court granted the motion and plaintiff appealed. 2 In these consolidated cases, the Minnesota
Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of parental immunity
and adopted a reasonable parent standard, holding that the
conduct of a parent in a parent-child action for negligence is to
be judged by the jury in light of what "an ordinarily reasonable
and prudent person-taking into account the parent-child rela3
tionship- [would] have done in similar circumstances." Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
Originally, an unemancipated minor in Minnesota could
not sue his or her parent in tort for either willful or negligent
conduct. 4 Fifty years ago the rule was modified to permit actions against parents for intentional torts, leaving them im2. Id. at 597.
3. Id. at 601. The reasonable parent standard originated in the California
case of Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
4. Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 515, 516, 237 N.W. 188, 188 (1931); Taubert v.
Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 249, 114 N.W. 763, 764 (1908). The doctrine of parental
immunity in tort has a curious history. At common law a minor child could always maintain an action against his or her parent to enforce contract or property rights. See, e.g., Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 125, 128 A. 292, 302 (1925);
King v. Sells, 193 Wash. 294, 297, 75 P.2d 130, 131 (1938). Although there are no
English cases on point, Scottish and Canadian courts have allowed children to
sue their parents in tort. Young v. Rankin, [1934] Sess. Cas. 499 (Scot. 2d Div.);
Deziel v. Deziel, [1953] 1 D.L.R. 651 (Can.). Commentators have speculated
that English law permits children to sue their parents in tort subject to the parents' privilege to enforce reasonable discipline against the child. W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 116 (4th ed. 1971).
In the United States, however, a child originally could not sue his or her
parent for even an intentional tort. The doctrine of parental immunity (distinguished from child-parent immunity which immunizes children against suits
initiated by their parents) originated in Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So.
885 (1891). Soon thereafter the parental immunity doctrine was accepted by
the majority of United States courts. W. PROSSER,supra, § 116. See also Baits
v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 426-29, 142 N.W.2d 66, 71-72 (1966).
The rationales cited in support of parental immunity include: (1) preservation of domestic tranquility; (2) promotion of parental care and authority;
(3) discouragement of fraud and collusion; and (4) avoidance of depletion of
family resources. See Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court 1967-68, Torts: Abrogation of ParentalImmunity, 53 MWzN. L REV. 1026, 1107 (1969).
Jurisdictions vary in their approach to parental immunity. Approaches to
the problem include: (1) total abrogation of immunity, see, e.g., Peterson v.
City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 486, 462 P.2d 1007, 1008-09 (1970);
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 439, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529,
532 (1969); (2) the "reasonable parent" standard enunciated in Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971); (3) abrogation of immunity except for activities associated with family relationships or
objectives, see, e.g., Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15
(1968); (4) abrogation with specific exceptions, see, e.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis.
2d 402, 413, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963); or (5) retention of parental immunity,
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mune from liability for negligence.5 In Silesky v. Kelman,6 the
court abrogated parental immunity in negligence cases except
when the alleged negligent act involved an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child, or when the act involved
an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the
provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental serv7
ices, and other care.
In Anderson the court recognized that the scope of the
Silesky exceptions was unclear, and therefore could lead to
"arbitrary line-drawing." The court maintained, however, that
such difficulties in interpretation are not sufficient to abandon
the Silesky approach. 8 The court rested its decisions on the
suitability of a reasonable parent standard as a means of protecting parental discretion while allowing compensation for injuries. The court emphasized that the reasonable parent
standard will not hold parents to such a high standard that any
misjudgment would lead to liability; reasonability will be determined in light of "'all of the relevant facts and circumstances."' 9 The majority asserted that this approach would
avoid the difficulties of interpretation found under Silesky, and
that juries are capable of determining reasonable parental conduct.10
In his dissent Justice Rogosheske emphasized the special
nature of the parent-child relationship and argued that the
see, e.g., Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 51, 316 A.2d 783, 785 (1972); Skinner v.
Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 484, 189 S.E.2d 230, 235 (1972).
5. See Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 539, 242 N.W. 1, 2 (1932). Although the presence of liability insurance originally had no bearing on the doctrine of parental immunity, later decisions predicated the abrogation of
immunity partially on the basis of the widespread prevalence of liability insurance. See, e.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 411-12, 122 N.W.2d 193, 197 (1963).
See also Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293, 479 P.2d 648,
653 (1971); note 9 infra.
6. 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968).
7. Id. at 442; 161 N.W.2d at 638. Silesky involved a suit by a minor against
his mother to recover for injuries suffered in an automobile accident. The court
refused to apply the immunity doctrine, reasoning that any possible disruption
of family harmony is negated by the prevalence of automobile insurance.
8. 295 N.W.2d at 599. For example, it is difficult for a trial court to determine what is meant by "reasonable" in the first exception and "ordinary" in the

second.
9. Id. at 599 (quoting Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 346, 385 N.E.2d
1268, 1277, 473 N.Y.S.2d 340, 349 (1978) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring)).
10. Further, the court reasoned that abolition of the Silesky exceptions
would not unduly increase intrafamilial discord; on the contrary, the court reasoned that when liability insurance is available to pay a claim against the parent, the likelihood of strife within the family is greater when the parent is
protected by the Silesky exceptions. Id. at 600.
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Silesky exceptions are superior to the reasonable parent standard in protecting this relationship. He stated that the Silesky
exceptions are designed to protect the various ways parents
choose to carry out their obligations, and thereby promote the
integrity of the family and a productive family atmosphere.
Justice Rogosheske argued that there are a number of distinct
problems with the reasonable parent standard of liability
adopted by the majority. Most significantly, the majority's approach would substitute a juror's views on childrearing for
those of the parent. He argued that this is inevitable because
jurors have strong views on childrearing and jury instructions
will not deter them from imposing their own ideas of appropriate parental conduct."
Adoption of the reasonable parent standard is a welcome
improvement in Minnesota tort law. It is easier to apply than
the Silesky exceptions and provides sufficient protection for
the parent. The reasonable parent standard eliminates the
need for a preliminary decision by the trial judge on the categorization of parental conduct, and allows the jury to determine
parental liability on the basis of the reasonableness of the conduct. Despite the dissent's concerns, the confidence of the Anderson majority that the new standard will be effectively and
equitably applied by juries is reasonable in light of the jury's
central role as a factfinder in our judicial system and the experience with jury application of the reasonable person standard
in other contexts.
C.

STANDARD OF MALICE IN DEFAMATION

Plaintiff Neil Stuempges was a Parke Davis sales representative with fifteen years seniority when he was assigned to a
new sales manager, Robert Jones. Jones and Stuempges
clashed immediately, disagreeing on several points involving
sales techniques. Approximately one year later, Jones gave
Stuempges a choice of resigning his position with Parke Davis
or being fired. Stuempges agreed to resign and in return Parke
Davis and Jones agreed to provide Stuempges with a good rec11. Justice Rogosheske rejected the contention that the existence of liability insurance supports the abolition of parental immunity because not all parents are adequately insured and because under Minnesota law juries are not
informed when an insurance company is the real party in interest. Because a
jury may not realize that a defendant parent is insured and desires recovery for
his or her child, the jury may not be able to assess the credibility of a parent's
testimony adequately. Id. at 603 (Rogosheske, J., dissenting).
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ommendation to prospective employers. Shortly after his resignation, Stuempges registered with an employment agency
specializing in sales personnel. When the agency called Jones
for a recommendation, Jones did not give Stuempges the
favorable recommendation promised, and disparaged
Stuempges' sales ability. As a result of the unfavorable recommendation, the agency refused to place Stuempges with a new
employer. Stuempges initiated a defamation action against
Parke Davis. Parke Davis unsuccessfully defended on the
ground that the statements were conditionally privileged. The
jury awarded Stuempges actual, compensatory, and punitive
damages. Parke Davis appealed, contending that the trial court
should have applied the United States Supreme Court's standard of actual malice established in New York Times v. Sullivan in determining liability and in awarding punitive
damages.' The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected both arguments, holding that in an employment context the prevailing
Minnesota common law standard of malice 2 is the appropriate
standard of fault for determining liability and the appropriate
standard for the award of punitive damages. Stuempges v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980).
At common law a statement is defamatory if it is communicated to a third party, is false, and tends to harm the plaintiff's
reputation and lower him or her in the estimation of the community.3 Defamatory statements relating to a plaintiff's profession, trade, or business are defamatory per se, and thus are
actionable without proof of actual damage. 4 In order to recover
exemplary or punitive damages, however, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant acted with malice.5 A communication
1. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the United
States Supreme Court required the plaintiff in an action against a media defendant to prove that the defamatory statement was made with actual malice,
"that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not." Id. at 280.
2. The Minnesota common law definition of malice requires the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant "made the statement from rn-win or improper motives, or causelessly and wantonly for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff."
Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980) (quoting McKenzie v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 149 Minn. 311, 312, 183
N.W. 516, 517 (1921)).
3. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, §§ 558-59 (1977); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 11, at 739 (4th ed. 1971).

4. Anderson v. Kammeier, 262 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. 1977); W. PROSSER,
supra note 3, at 754.

5. McCuskey v. Kuhlmann, 147 Minn. 460, 461, 179 N.W. 1000, 1000 (1920);
MacInnis v. National Herald Printing Co., 140 Minn. 171, 175, 167 N.W. 550, 551
(1918).
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is conditionally privileged if it is made upon a proper occasion,
from a proper motive, and based upon reasonable or probable
cause. 6 When the defendant establishes the existence of a conditional privilege, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
abused the privilege or acted with malice to receive any kind of
7
damages.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
compensation of injured individuals is a legitimate state interest, but has imposed limits on state defamation law in order to
preserve the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,8 a suit
brought by a private individual against a publisher, the Court
held that the states may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability in defamation "so long as they do not impose liability without fault."9 In addition, the Court held that
punitive damages are not recoverable in defamation in the absence of a showing that the statement was made with actual
malice as defined in New York Times, that is, "with knowledge
of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity."1o
There is much debate among courts and commentators
about whether the United States Supreme Court intended the
rules enunciated in Gertz to apply to cases involving media and
nonmedia defendants alike, or whether they would apply only
to cases involving constitutional issues of freedom of the
press." Some courts have applied Gertz to all defamation ac6. Hebner v. Great N. Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 292, 80 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1899).
7. Id. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 786-96.
8. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
9. Id. at 347-48. Originally, defamation was a matter of strict liability. See
Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch- Ten Years of Balancing
Libel Law and the FirstAmendment, 26 HASTiNGs UJ.777 (1975); Note, Minnesota Defamation Law and the Constitution: First Amendment Limitations on
the Common Law Torts of Libel and Slander, 3 WM. MrrcHELL U REv.81, 82

(1977).
10. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 350.
11. Justice White in his dissent felt that the Gertz holding applied to "each
and every defamation action." Id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting). Commentators
are also divided. See, e.g., Brosnahan, supra note 9, at 791 ('Ie majority opinion did not set out the precise scope of its holding, and this omission leaves the
decision subject to different interpretations of the extent of its reach."); Frakt,
Defamation Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc- The Emerging Common Law, 10
RuTr.-CAm. L.J. 519, 573 (1979) ("It is impossible to determine whether the Court
intended to apply Gertz requirements to all defamation cases."); Nimmer, Introduction-IsFreedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 649 (1975) ("It seems fair, then, to
conclude that the Gertz opinion formulates doctrine applicable only to defamatory statements made by newspapers and broadcasters, i.e., 'the media."').
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tions,12 while others have limited the holding to media cases. 13
Prior to Stuempges, the Minnesota Supreme Court had not
directly faced this question.14 On the issue of liability the
Stuempges court held that Gertz did not require New York
Times actual malice in a nonmedia case. The court reasoned
that the New York Times standard was fashioned as an exception to the common law rule to permit the media to perform
their function of informing the public without undue fear of
defamation liability and that the common law rule remained
appropriate for nonmedia defendants.15 This conclusion finds
support in the language of the Supreme Court's opinion, which
emphasized the balance between protection against media selfcensorship and protection of individual reputations. 6 Moreover, the Gertz Court explicitly stated that the states may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability.
On the issue of damages the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that punitive damages can be awarded in cases of defamation per se without proof of actual damages to the plaintiff as
long as the plaintiff demonstrates the existence of common law
malice.' 7 The court endorsed awards of punitive damages as a
means of protecting employees from vindictive previous employers. In response to the argument that Gertz requires a
showing of New York Times actual malice for punitive damages, the court maintained that the requirement of actual malice in Gertz was imposed because of the Supreme Court's
worry "that 'jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship.""18
Thus, the court reasoned, because Stuempges did not involve
media self-censorship, the court was free to permit juries to
award punitive damages.' 9
The Stuempges court was correct in concluding that Gertz
allows states to impose liability without a showing of New York
Times actual malice, but it is not clear that the United States
12. See, e.g., Marchesi v. Francnino, 283 Md. 131, 387 A.2d 1129 (1978);
Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Wynn v. Cole, 91
Mich. App. 517, 284 N.W.2d 144 (1979).
13. See, e.g., Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 932, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 82, 85 (1975); Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 425, 579 P.2d 83, 84 (1978); Calero
v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 505, 228 N.W.2d 737, 747 (1975).
14. See Anderson v. Kammeier, 262 N.W.2d 366, 372 n.5 (Minn. 1977).
15. 297 N.W.2d at 258.
16. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 340-41.
17. 297 N.W.2d at 259-60.
18. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
19. Id. at 260.
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Supreme Court left states similar latitude to award punitive
damages. Although the Gertz Court conceded that compensation of injured individuals is a legitimate state interest for
20
which states may establish their own standards of liability, it
also suggested that the state has no substantial interest in the
award of punitive damages in defamation actions. 21 This policy
would seem to apply to both media and nonmedia defendants,
thus casting doubt upon the Stuempges court's refusal to follow
Gertz as to the standard for the award of punitive damages. 22

20. 418 U.S. at 347-48.
21. Id. at 349.
22. The most widely accepted reading of Gertz requires a showing of actual malice before punitive damages may be recovered, regardless of whether
the defendant is a media institution or a private individual. See Note, supra
note 9, at 110-11. See also Frakt,supra note 11. Some commentators have gone
so far as to suggest that Gertz signals the abolition of punitive damages in defamation law. See, e.g., Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 CoLuM. L REv. 1205, 1252-54 (1976) (suggesting that Gertz may
presage the general demise of punitive damages in defamation actions). See
also Eaton, The American Law of Defamation through Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. and Beyond- An Analytical Primer,61 VA. L REV. 1349,1439-40 (1975) (suggesting that Gertz eliminates punitive damage awards in all but a handful of
cases).

